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Abstract
This Comment argues that a ban on information regarding the availability of abortion in other
Member States violates the Treaty by obstructing the free movement of services. Part I of this
Comment examines the provision in Community law for the free movement of services and tracks
the development of laws regulating abortion in Ireland and the Community. Part II discusses
Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan, in which the Court of
Justice declined to address the validity of Ireland’s ban on information regarding the availability
of abortion services in England. Part III argues that the Court of Justice should have taken the
opportunity to pronounce that this ban on information obstructs the free movement of services in
violation of Community law. In addition, Part III discusses the failure of the Court of Justice to
resolve the conflict between competing fundamental human rights. This Comment concludes that
by permitting the injunction issued by the Irish Supreme Court, the Court of Justice has slowed
the integration of the Community.
COMMENT
SOCIETY FOR THE PROTECTION OF UNBORN CHILDREN
(IRELAND) LTD. V GROGAN: IRISH ABORTION
LAW AND THE FREE MOVEMENT OF
SERVICES IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY
INTRODUCTION
The free movement of services is one of the fundamental
pillars of the European Economic Community (the "Commu-
nity").' The Treaty of Rome (the "Treaty") prohibits Member
States from obstructing the freedom to provide services.2 Sub-
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts.
59-66, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958) [hereinafter
EEC Treaty or Treaty] (providing for free exchange of services); Cowan v. Le Tr~sor
Public, Case 186/87, [1989] E.C.R. 195, [1990] 2 C.M.L.R. 613 (noting free move-
ment of services plays independent role as fundamental freedom). But see Commis-
sion White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market, E.C. BULL. 6, at 18, 19
(1985) [hereinafter Comm'n White Paper] (noting slower progress in freedom to
provide services, as opposed to goods, although distinction not valid and economic
potential weakened by maintaining it).
2. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 3, 59-66. The Single European Act, O.J. L
169/1 (1987) [hereinafter S.E.A.], reaffirmed the European Economic Community's
[hereinafter the Community] dedication to the free movement of services. Article 13
of the S.E.A. states that "[t]he internal market shall comprise an area without internal
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is en-
sured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty." Id. at 7.
The European Court ofJustice [hereinafter Court ofJustice] played a major role
in implementing the objectives of the Treaty by developing the doctrines of direct
effect the and primacy of Community law. The doctrine of direct effect provides that
individuals may invoke certain Treaty articles in national courts without prior imple-
mentation in national law. Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Be-
lastingen, Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1, 12, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105, 129. Treaty articles
are directly effective where the Treaty imposes obligations "in a clearly defined way
upon individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon the institutions of the
Community." Id. at 13, [1963] C.M.L.R. at 130. Moreover, national courts must
apply Community law directly, regardless of contrary national law. Costa v. ENEL,
Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585, 593-94, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425, 456.
The Court of Justice has held that Articles 59 and 60 are sufficiently precise to
have direct effect. Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de
Metaalnijverheid, Case 33/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1299, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 298 (finding
first paragraph of Article 59 and third paragraph of Article 60 to have direct effect).
For a discussion of direct effect in EEC law, see JOSEPHINE STEINER, TEXTBOOK ON
EEC LAW 21-33 (2d ed. 1990).
The Court ofJustice furthered the Treaty's goal of economic and social cohesion
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sequent legislation specifically recognizes the right of any
Community national to travel freely between Member States to
receive services.3
In 1989, the Irish Supreme Court enjoined several student
groups from distributing literature regarding the availability of
abortion in England. 4 The Supreme Court held that the distri-
bution of such information violated the Irish constitutional
proscription against abortion.5 The students argued that the
injunction conflicted with the right to receive services under
Community law and the right to impart information guaran-
teed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the "Human Rights Con-
vention").6 Although the European Court of Justice (the
by asserting the primacy of Community law over prior and subsequent national law.
Costa, [1964] E.C.R. at 593-94, [1964] C.M.L.R. at 456. In addition, the Court of
Justice subsequently held that Community law takes precedence over all national law,
including constitutional or fundamental rights. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello
Stato v. Simmenthal, [1978] E.C.R. 629, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 263; Internationale
Handelgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und-Vorratsstelle, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R.
1125, 1134, [1972] C.M.L.R. 255, 283 [hereinafter IHG]. The Simmenthal Court
stated that
[i]n accordance with the principle of the precedence of Community law,
[Treaty provisions and legislation] not only by their entry into force render
automatically inapplicable any conflicting provision of current national law
but . . . also preclude the valid adoption of new national legislative meas-
ures to the extent to which they would be incompatible with Community
provisions .... It follows from the foregoing that every national court must,
in a case within its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its entirety and pro-
tect rights which the latter confers on individuals and must accordingly set
aside any provision of national law which may conflict with it, whether prior
or subsequent to the Community rule.
Id. at 643-44, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 283.
3. General Program for the Abolition of Restrictions on the Freedom to Provide
Services, 2 J.0. 32 (1962), OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1974 (IX), at 3 [hereinafter Service
Program]; Council Directive 64/220, 56J.0. 845 (1964), 0.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1963-
1964, at 115, updated by Council Directive 73/148, 0.J. L 172/14 (1973) [hereinafter
Service Directive] (recognizing freedom to receive services in another Member State
as corollary to freedom to provide services guaranteed by Treaty).
4. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan, 1989
I.R. 760 (Ir. S.C. 1989).
5. Id. at 764; see IR. CONST. art. 40.3.3. Article 40.3.3 [hereinafter Eighth
Amendment] provides that "[t]he State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn
and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right." Id.
6. Grogan, 1989 I.R. at 761; see European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
(1955) [hereinafter Human Rights Convention]. Article 10 of the Human Rights
Convention states that
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"Court of Justice") recognized abortion as a service, it found
that the students did not have standing to raise the issue of
Ireland's prohibition of the distribution of information about
abortion services offered in other Member States. The Court,
therefore, declined to address the compatibility of the ban with
Community law. The Court of Justice based this finding
mainly on the absence of a link between the students and the
clinics in England that provide abortion services.8 Moreover,
the Court failed to resolve the conflict between the right to
expression guaranteed by the Human Rights Convention and
the right to life of the fetus protected by the Irish Constitu-
tion.9
This Comment argues that a ban on information regard-
ing the availability of abortion in other Member States violates
the Treaty by obstructing the free movement of services. Part
I of this Comment examines the provision in Community law
for the free movement of services and tracks the development
of laws regulating abortion in Ireland and the Community.
Part II discusses Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ire-
land) Ltd. v. Grogan,'° in which the Court of Justice declined to
address the validity of Ireland's ban on information regarding
the availability of abortion services in England. Part III argues
that the Court of Justice should have taken the opportunity to
pronounce that this ban on information obstructs the free
movement of services in violation of Community law. In addi-
tion, Part III discusses the failure of the Court of Justice to
resolve the conflict between competing fundamental human
rights. This Comment concludes that by permitting the in-
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and
ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions
or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic soci-
ety ... for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, for the protection of the ... rights of others ....
Id. at 230.
7. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan, Case
C-159/90, [1991] E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 539, 581.
8. Id. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC at 580.
9. Id.
10. Id., Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 539.
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junction issued by the Irish Supreme Court, the Court of Jus-
tice has slowed the integration of the Community.
I. SERVICE LA WAND ABORTION IN THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
A. Free Flow of Services within the Community
The free movement of services is fundamental to the
Community system." Article 59 of the Treaty calls for the ab-
olition of restrictions on the freedom to provide services.' 2 A
Member State may only derogate from Article 59 if necessary
for the protection of an imperative public interest' 3 which can-
not be protected by less restrictive measures. 4 Moreover, any
national restrictions must not unjustifiably discriminate based
11. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing exchange of services as
fundamental freedom).
12. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 59. Article 59 provides that
[w]ithin the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on free-
dom to provide services within the Community shall be progressively abol-
ished during the transitional period in respect of nationals of Member States
who are established in a State of the Community other than that of the per-
son for whom the services are intended.
The Council may, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the
Commission, extend the provisions of the Chapter to nationals of a third
country who provide services and who are established within the Commu-
nity.
Id.
The subsequent articles in the services section of the Treaty provide for imple-
mentation of Articles 59 and 60. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 61-66. Article 61
relates to the freedom to provide services in the field of transport, and is not relevant
to the present discussion. Article 62 serves as the standstill clause that prohibits
Member States from introducing "any new restrictions on the freedom to provide
services which have in fact been attained at the date of the entry into force of [the]
Treaty." Article 63 governs the proposal and implementation of an interim program
and directives as a means to ensure the free flow of services. Article 64 declares the
Member States' readiness to "undertake the liberalization of services beyond the ex-
tent required by the directives" where possible. Where restrictions on services have
not yet been abolished, Article 65 prohibits distinctions based on nationality or resi-
dence of the person providing the service. Finally, Article 66 provides that Articles
55 to 58, which qualify the rights granted by Treaty articles, apply to services as well.
See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 61-66.
13. Commission v. Germany, Case 205/84, [1986] E.C.R. 3755, 3803, [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 69, 148 [hereinafter German Insurance]; see In re Webb, Case 279/80,
[1981] E.C.R. 3305, 3325, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 736. The Court ofJustice stated
that "the freedom to provide services is one of the fundamental principles of the
Treaty and may be restricted only by provisions which are justified by the general
good" and which are imposed equally on all persons in the Member State. Id.
14. German Insurance, [1986] E.C.R. at 3803, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. at 148.
479
480 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLA WJOURNAL [Vol. 15:476
on the nationality or residence of the providers of services.' 5
An activity qualifies as a service under the Treaty if it satis-
fies the two requirements of Article 60.16 First, the activity
must normally be provided for remuneration. 17 The Court of
Justice defined remuneration as consideration for a service
which is normally agreed upon between the provider and the
recipient.I The transaction need not be predetermined, how-
ever, and the amount paid may be minimal. '9 Second, to qual-
ify as a service, the activity must fit into one of the categories
delineated in Article 60.20 For example, the Court of Justice
15. Id.; Bond van Adverteerders v. Netherlands, Case 352/85, [1988] E.C.R.
2085, 2134, [19891 3 C.M.L.R. 113, 151. In Bond, the Court stated that "[n]ational
rules which are not applicable to services without distinction as regards their origin
and which are therefore discriminatory are compatible with Community law only if
they can be brought within the scope of an express derogation." Id.; see EEC Treaty,
supra note 1, art. 7 (prohibiting discrimination). But cf. Regina v. Saunders, Case
175/78, [1979] E.C.R. 1129, [1979] 2 C.M.L.R. 216 (finding that penal measure
which confines national to particular area of her own Member State is purely national
measure that falls outside scope of Treaty).
16. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 60. Article 60 provides that
[s]ervices shall be considered to be 'services' within the meaning of this
Treaty where they are normally provided for remuneration, in so far as they
are not governed by the provisions relating to freedom of movement for
goods, capital and persons.
'Services' shall in particular include:
(a) activities of an industrial character;
(b) activities of a commercial character;
(c) activities of craftsmen;
(d) activities of the professions.
Without prejudice to the provisions of the Chapter relating to the right
of establishment, the person providing a service may, in order to do so,
temporarily pursue his activity in the State where the service is provided,
under the same conditions as are imposed by that State on its own nationals.
Id.
17. Id.
18. Belgium v. Humbel, Case 263/86, [1988] E.C.R. 5365, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R.
393. Services provided by the state for the benefit of its citizens, rather than for
profit, do not meet the Article 60 requirements. Id. at 5388, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at
405. In Humbel, a French boy living with his family in Luxembourg questioned the
fee he was obliged to pay to attend school as a foreign student. d. at 5385, [1989] 1
C.M.L.R. at 403. Luxembourg nationals did not have to pay the fee. Id. The Court
held that the element of remuneration was not present in the case because the school
was part of the national education system and was funded by the state. Id. at 5388,
[1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 405. See generally STEINER, supra note 2, at 200-201 (discussing
right to receive services in Community).
19. Cowan v. Le Tr6sor Public, Case 186/87, [1989] E.C.R. 195, [1990] 2
C.M.L.R. 613 (finding that tourist who used metro qualified as recipient of service).
20. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 60; see supra note 16 (listing categories).
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recognizes medical care as a service because it fits within the
"activities of the professions" category. 2' Finally, Article 60
specifies that Article 59 is not relevant when a particular activ-
ity is protected by other Treaty provisions. 22 Where other pro-
visions do not apply, however, Article 59 guarantees that no
economic activity is denied the protection of Community law.23
1. Freedom to Receive Services
From the outset, legislation implementing the free move-
ment of services recognized the right to receive services.2 4
The Community initially provided for the free movement of
services through the General Programme for the Abolition of
Restrictions on the Freedom to Provide Services (the "Services
Program"). 25 The Services Program specified that indirect re-
strictions on services, such as the obstruction of the recipient
of services, must be abolished.2 6 Subsequently, Council Direc-
tive 64/220 (the "Service Directive") required Member States
to abolish restrictions on Community nationals who wished to
travel to another Member State to receive services. 7
To qualify for Treaty protection as the recipient of a ser-
21. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan,
Case C-159/90, [1991] E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 539, 579
(finding termination of pregnancy is service); Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero del
Tesoro, Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83, [1984] E.C.R. 377, 408, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R.
52, 82 (finding medical care is service).
The Court of Justice recognizes many other activities as services under Article
60. See, e.g., Bond Van Adverteerders v. Netherlands, Case 352/85, [1988] E.C.R.
2085, 2132, [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. 113, 151 (broadcasting); Commission v. Germany,
Case 427/85, [1988] E.C.R. 1123, 1167, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. 677, 710 (legal activity);
Knoors v. Secretary of State, Case 115/78, [1979] E.C.R. 399, 411, [1979] 2
C.M.L.R. 357, 367 (plumbing and heating); Ministire Public v. Van Wesemael,
Joined Cases 110 & 111/78, [1979] E.C.R. 35, 55, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 87, 111 (em-
ployment agencies for entertainers); Dona v. Mantero, Case 13/76, [1976] E.C.R.
1333, 1342, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 578, 588 (professional sports); Exparte Sacchi, Case
155/73, [1974] E.C.R. 409, 431, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 177, 205 (television broadcasting
and advertising).
22. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 60.
23. See Ernst Steindorff, Freedom of Services in the EEC, 11 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 347,
365 (1988).
24. Service Program, supra note 3, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1974 (IX), at 3; see Service
Directive, supra note 3, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1963-1964, at 115; see also Steindorff, supra
note 23, at 355-57.
25. Services Program, supra note 3, OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1974 (IX), at 3.
26. Id.
27. Service Directive, supra note 3, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1963-1964, at 115.
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vice, a Community national must travel to another Member
State for the purpose of receiving a service 28 and stay for a
limited time.29 For example, the Court recognizes tourists as
recipients of services because they plan to remain for a short
time, and intend to receive services in the host country.30
Workers, in contrast, are not considered recipients because
their stay is indefinite and their intention is to work in the host
country, not to receive services there."'
The Court ofJustice also recognizes rights corollary to the
freedom to receive services.3 2 In Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero
del Tesoro, 3 Mr. Luisi and Ms. Carbone were fined for export-
ing amounts of Italian currency exceeding the legal limit pro-
vided by Italian law.34 They admitted to exporting the money
to pay for medical services and tourism in other Member
States. 5 They claimed, however, a right to export currency as
a corollary to the right to receive services under Article 59.36
The Court of Justice recognized that without corollary rights
that enable individuals to receive services, Article 59 would be
rendered meaningless.3 7 The Court held that the right to ex-
28. Italy v. Watson, Case 118/75, [1976] E.C.R. 1185,-1198, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R.
552, 572 (finding that Italy could require U.K. national who entered Italy to work as
au pre to register with state).
29. Steymann v. Staatssecretaris vanjustitie, Case 196/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6159,
6175, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 449, 456. Mr. Steymann was a German national who lived
on a religious commune in the Netherlands. Id. at 6170, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 454.
He provided plumbing and other services for the commune in exchange for food,
clothing and lodging. Id. Mr. Steymann sued the administrative agency responsible
for denying his residency permit, relying on the Treaty provisions guaranteeing the
free exchange of services. Id. at 6174, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 455. He claimed that as a
provider and recipient of services, he was entitled to residency. Id. The Court of
Justice denied his claim noting that Articles 59 and 60 do not apply when the stay is
permanent or of indefinite duration. Id. at 6175, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 455.
30. Cowan v. Le Tr6sor Public, Case 186/87, [1989] E.C.R. 195, 220-221,
[1990] 2 C.M.L.R. 613, 631; Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero del TesoroJoined Cases
286/82 & 26/83, [1984] E.C.R. 377, 408, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 52, 82.
31. Steymann, [1988] E.C.R. at 6175, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 456. But see EEC
Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 48-51 (providing for free movement of workers).
32. Cowan, [1989] E.C.R. at 221, [1990] 2 C.M.L.R. at 631 (finding protection
from harm in Member State to which person travels to receive services is corollary to
free movement of services); Luisi and Carbone, [1984] E.C.R. at 401, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R.
at 76 (finding right to export capital corollary to right to receive services).
33. [1984] E.C.R. 377, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 52.
34. Id. at 397-98, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. at 74.
35. Id. at 398, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. at 74.
36. Id. They also claimed a right to export capital based on Article 106. Id.
37. Id. at 403, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. at 78.
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port money to pay for services is a necessary corollary to the
right to receive services in other Member States, to the extent
that the underlying service had been liberalized. 8
In GB-INNO-BM v. Confediration du Commerce Luxembourgeois
("GB-INNO"),39 the Court of Justice recognized access to in-
formation to be an essential corollary to the free movement of
goods.4" The Court held that a Luxembourg law prohibiting
the listing of discount prices available in Belgium to be incom-
patible with Community law because blocking information
available to the consumer obstructed the free movement of
goods in violation of the Treaty.4 1 The free movement of
goods, the Court noted, must include the free movement of
consumers to buy those goods.4 2 The Court observed that
Community policy establishes a "close link" between con-
sumer protection and access to information.43 Moreover, the
Court found that the provision of information to the consumer
is "one of the principle requirements" of the free movement of
goods under Community law. 44 The Court concluded that na-
tional laws that deny the consumer access to information, such
as advertisements of discount prices available in other Member
States, cannot be justified under the Treaty.4 5
This holding regarding the exchange of goods can be ap-
plied by analogy to the exchange of services.46 As Advocate
General Van Gerven noted in Grogan,
[i]n the judgement of GB-INNO, the court emphasized, in
38. Id. at 408, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. at 82.
39. Case C-362/88, [1990] E.C.R. 667, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 801 [hereinafter GB-
INNO].
40. GB-INNO, [1990] E.C.R. 689, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 801, 816.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 686, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. at 814.
43. Id. at 687, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. at 815. In Grogan, the Court ofJustice used the
"link" language of GB-INNO to create a new requirement for a "link" between the
economic operator and the publisher. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children
(Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan, Case C-159/90, [1991] E.C.R. -, , Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 577, 579 (stating "[ilt is undisputed that the [students] had no
links with clinics in another member state."); see infra notes 186-93 and accompanying
text (discussing the Grogan "link" theory).
44. GB-INNO, Case C-362/88, [1990] E.C.R. 667, 689, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 801,
816.
45. Id.
46. See Comm'n White Paper, supra note 1, at 18-19 (noting invalidity of distinc-
tions between goods and services); see also Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven,
Grogan, [1991] E.C.R. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC at 560.
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connection with offering goods for sale, the interest of con-
sumer information. It stated that consumers' freedom to
shop in another member state is compromised if they are
deprived of access in their own country to advertising avail-
able in the country where purchases are made. I can see no
reason why the position should be otherwise with regard to
information provided about a service ....
2. Derogation from the Treaty
The Treaty provides for derogation from the guarantee of
free movement of services in certain circumstances.48 One cir-
cumstance under which a Member State may derogate from
Article 59 is where an imperative public policy is threatened.4 9
However, the Court of Justice interprets strictly the scope and
meaning of the Service Directive's provisions for a derogation
based on public policy. 50 The Court has recognized three re-
quirements for a valid public policy derogation. First, the re-
striction proposed must be "objectively justified ' 5 ' to protect
47. Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven, Grogan, [1991] E.C.R. at -'
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC at 560.
48. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 56 (applying to exchange of services pursuant
to Article 66). Even where a restrictive measure does not meet the requirements of
Article 56, the Treaty provides another method for derogation from Article 59. EEC
Treaty, supra note 1, art. 55. The Council may elect to remove certain activities en-
tirely from the sphere of services protected by Article 59. Id. This procedure has
never been used, and many scholars consider it obsolete. Steindorff, supra note 23, at
401 (citations omitted).
49. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 56; German Insurance, Case 205/84, [1986]
E.C.R. 3755, 3808, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 69, 102. The three bases for derogation from
Article 59 are public policy, public security, and public health. Id.; see Council Direc-
tive 64/221, 56 J.O. 850 (1964), OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1963-1964 (IX), at 117. The
public health derogation can only be used regarding specific disabilities, diseases,
and disorders listed in the directive's annex. Id. at 119. The public security deroga-
tion is not relevant to the present discussion.
50. Van Duyn v. Home Office, Case 41/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1337, 1350, [1975] 1
C.M.L.R. 1, 17. The Van Duyn Court found that the concept of public policy must be
interpreted strictly: "[Ilts scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member
State without being subject to control by the institutions of the Community." Id.
Although Van Duyn concerned Treaty provisions regarding the free movement of
workers, as the Court ofJustice indicated, provisions regarding services and workers
"are based on the same principles both in so far as they concern the entry into and
residence in the territory of Member States." Italy v. Watson, Case 118/75, [1976]
E.C.R. 1185, 1197, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 552, 570.
51. Van Binsbergen v. Bedrijfsvereniging Metaalnijverheid, Case 33/74, [1974]
E.C.R. 1299, 1310, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 298, 313.
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an imperative public policy interest. 2 Second, the means used
to protect the public policy must be proportional to the end
sought.53 Third, the prohibition must not discriminate on the
basis of nationality or residence. 4
To determine the clarity and importance of the public pol-
icy objective, the Court of Justice examines several factors. A
law prohibiting the activity may evidence a public policy con-
cern that justifies the derogation from the Treaty.55 For exam-
ple, the United Kingdom had a law that prohibited retailers
from selling certain goods on Sundays.56 A French retailer
with shops in the United Kingdom argued that the law ob-
structed the free movement of goods in violation of the
Treaty. The Court ofJustice stated that the United Kingdom
had a legitimate public policy aim of arranging working and
non-working hours in accordance with "national or regional
52. German Insurance, [1986] E.C.R. at 3808, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. at 102; Rutili v.
Minister for the Interior, Case 36/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1219, 1231, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R.
140, 155 (requiring "genuine and sufficiently serious threat to public policy" tojus-
tify derogation).
53. Bond Van Adverteerders v. Netherlands, Case 352/85, [1988] E.C.R. 2085,
2135, [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. 113, 151.
54. Id. at 2134, [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. at 152; Adoui and Cornuaille v. Belgian State
and City of Liege, Case 116/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1665, 1712, [1982] 3 C.M.L.R. 631,
665 (finding Belgium could not exclude French nationals on basis that prostitution
violated public policy where same standard was not applied to Belgian prostitutes);
Rutili, [1975] E.C.R. at 1236-37, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. at 158-59 (finding that France
could only impose restrictions on Italian union activist residing in France where such
restriction could also be imposed on French national).
55. Regina v. Henn, Case 34/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3795, 3817, [1980] 1 C.M.L.R.
.246, 275 (holding that while ban on import of certain pornographic materials vio-
lated Treaty provisions regarding free flow of goods, it was justified to protect public
morality where there was no legal trade in goods in United Kingdom). But see Cone-
gate, Ltd. v. H.M. Customs and Excise, Case 121/85, [1986] E.C.R. 1007, 1025,
[1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 739, 756 (holding that United Kingdom could not exclude sexu-
ally explicit inflatable dolls based on public morality where a legal trade in the dolls
existed within United Kingdom). The activity sought to be restricted does not have
to be illegal, however, in order to meet public policy requirements. For example, the
Court of Justice allowed the United Kingdom to exclude a practitioner of
Scientology, even though the practice of Scientology was not illegal in the United
Kingdom. Van Duyn v. Home Office, Case 41/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1337, 1350-51,
[1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 1, 17. The Court stated that an administrative measure that ex-
pressed the United Kingdom's belief that the activity is socially undesirable was suffi-
cient to justify a derogation. Id. at 1351, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at 17.
56. See Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q plc, Case C-145/88, [1989] E.C.R.
3851, 3886, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 337, 362.
57. Id. at 3887, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. at 362.
485
486 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 15:476
socio-cultural characteristics.
Moreover, the Court of Justice requires that to resort to
the public policy derogation a Member State must show that
the perceived threat to public policy affects one of the funda-
mental interests of society59 and is "necessary for the protec-
tion of those interests in a 'democratic society.' ",60 Thus, in
Adoui and Cornuaille v. Belgian State and City of Liege, 6' Belgium
was prevented from using the public policy derogation to ex-
clude two French prostitutes while at the same time allowing
Belgian nationals to practice prostitution.62 Allowing Belgian
nationals to engage in the activity undercut Belgium's claim
that it had a clear and important public policy against prostitu-
tion.63
The second requirement for a public policy derogation is
that the means employed to implement the policy be "propor-
tional" to the public policy goal.' The proportionality doc-
trine states that only the least restrictive means available may
be used to achieve a Member State's valid policy objective.6 5
Thus, Germany could not cite public policy or public health
58. Id. at 3889, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. at 364.
59. Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, Case 36/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1219, 1232,
[1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 140, 155 (referring to rights guaranteed by Human Rights Con-
vention).
60. Id.; see Regina v. Bouchereau, Case 30/77, [1977] E.C.R. 1999, 2014, [1977]
2 C.M.L.R. 800, 825. In Bouchereau, the Court stated that
[iln so far as it may justify certain restrictions on the free movement of per-
sons subject to Community law, recourse by a national authority to the con-
cept of public policy presupposes, in any event, the existence ... of a genu-
ine and sufficiently serious threat to the requirements of public policy affect-
ing one of the fundamental interests of society.
Id.
61. Joined Cases 115 & 116/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1665, [1982] 3 C.M.L.R. 631.
62. Id. at 1707-08, [1982] 3 C.M.L.R. at 662.
63. Id.; see Conegate, Ltd. v. H.M. Customs & Excise, Case 121/85, [1986]
E.C.R. 1007, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 734 (finding that United Kingdom did not prove
imperative policy interest in banning pornographic material because same items
could circulate in certain parts of country).
64. Bond van Adverteerders v. Netherlands, Case 352/85, [1988] E.C.R. 2085,
2134, [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. 113, 151. In Bond, the Court stated that "[a]s an exception
to a fundamental principle of the Treaty, Article 56 of the Treaty must be interpreted
in such a way that its effects are limited to that which is necessary in order to protect
the interests which it seeks to safeguard." Id. at 2135, [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. at 151.
65. See Rewe-Zentral v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fir Branntwein, Case 120/
78, [1979] E.C.R. 649, 664, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 494, 509-10 [hereinafter Cassis de
Dijon].
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concerns to exclude a French liqueur that had an alcoholic
content lower than that of its German counterpart.66 In this
instance, appropriate labelling would have been a less restric-
tive means of meeting Germany's policy objective of consumer
protection.6 7
The third requirement for a valid public policy derogation
is that the obstructive action not unjustifiably discriminate
against services offered by other Member States. 68 Even well-
tailored means used to protect a clear public policy must not
discriminate on the basis of nationality.6 9 In Luisi and Carbone,
for example, Italy had created an obstacle to the freedom of its
nationals to travel and receive medical services in other Mem-
ber States, but it had created no similar difficulty for its nation-
als receiving the same services in Italy.70 This restriction could
grant a commercial advantage to Italian medical services be-
cause Italians seeking expensive procedures would be forced
to use domestic medical services. Though Italy had a clear in-
terest in slowing capital flight, and limiting currency export
was a proportional means to accomplish this end, the law's dis-
criminatory effect rendered the public policy argument ineffec-
tive to justify derogation from the Treaty.7'
The Court of Justice asserts that covert as well as overt
discrimination violates Articles 59 and 60.72 Thus, discrimina-
66. Id.
67. Id. For a case discussing the proportionality doctrine in the area of services,
see Bond, [1988] E.C.R. at 2134, [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. at 151. In Bond, the Court held
that the Netherlands' total ban on certain advertising subtitling, based on the policy
objective of limiting the commercialization of the media, was inappropriate. Id. at
2135, [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. at 151. The Court noted several methods by which the
cable programming industry could be regulated that were less restrictive than a total
ban. Id.
68. See id. at 2134, [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. at 151. Neither the host Member State nor
the home Member State may block the recipient or the provider of services. Id. at
2136, [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. at 152; see also Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro,
Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83, [1984] E.C.R. 395, 401, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 52, 77. But
see Procureur du Roi v. Debauve, Case 52/79, [1980] E.C.R. 833, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R.
362 (finding that in absence of harmonization of field, each Member State can regu-
late or prohibit television advertising).
69. Luisi and Carbone, [1984] E.C.R. at 406, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. at 81.
70. Id. at 398, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. at 74.
71. Id. at 408, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. at 82.
72. Commission v. Ireland, Case 61/77, [1978] E.C.R. 417, 450, [1978] 2
C.M.L.R. 466, 517. But see Groener v. Minister for Education and City of Dublin
Vocational Education Committee, Case 379/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3967, 3994, [1990] 1
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tion which is based on apparently neutral criteria, but which
has a discriminatory effect, is prohibited. 73 For example, Ire-
land passed a law banning all boats over a certain size from
fishing its waters. 4 Ireland's fishing fleet had no boats of the
prohibited size. 7' The effect of the law, therefore, was to ban
boats from other Member States while providing an advantage
to the Irish fleet.76 The law, neutral on its face, covertly dis-
criminated on the basis of nationality and was thus declared
invalid as contrary to Community law.77
The Court of Justice further considered proportionality
and discrimination in cases regarding bans on advertising. In
Procureur du Roi v. Debauve,78 the Court held that a ban on ad-
vertising by cable operators was not contrary to the Treaty's
provisions on services. The Court said that the ban was not
disproportionate because it was "relatively ineffective."' 79 The
ban did not discriminate because foreign broadcasters could
still broadcast in natural reception zones.8 0 Insofar as the area
was not harmonized, Article 59 did not preclude the prohibi-
tion on advertising by cable television, as long as the rule ap-
plied without distinction to nationality or residence.8 ' Subse-
quently, in Bond Van Adverteerders v. Netherlands 2 the Court held
that despite the Netherlands' interest in maintaining the "non-
commercial," "pluralistic" nature of their broadcasting system,
it could not justify a similar ban on foreign cable operators.8 3
C.M.L.R. 401, 415 (upholding Ireland's requirement that teachers able to speak
Gaelic receive preference in hiring).
73. Ireland, [1978] E.C.R. at 450, [1978] 2 C.M.L.R. at 517. However, an activity
need not be discriminatory to violate the Treaty. See Cassis de Dijon, Case 120/78,
[1979] E.C.R. 649, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 494. The Court of Justice held that where a
measure unjustifiably obstructs the free movement of goods or services, the activity
cannot be compatible with the Treaty, even absent a discriminatory effect. Id.
74. Ireland, [1978] E.C.R. at 440-41, [1978] 2 C.M.L.R. at 509-10.
75. Id. at 449, [1978] 2 C.M.L.R. at 516.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 450-52, [1978] 2 C.M.L.R. at 516-17.
78. Case 52/79, [1980] E.C.R. 833, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 362.
79. Id. at 859-60; [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. at 396. Natural reception zones permitted
television advertising to reach Belgium. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 859, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. at 396.
82. Case 352/85, [1988] E.C.R. 2085, [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. 113.
83. Id. at 2135, [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. at 151.
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3. Fundamental Rights in Community Law
In addition to enforcing adherence to specific provisions
of the Treaty, the Court ofJustice may examine the compatibil-
ity of a national law with the general principles of fundamental
rights and freedoms.8 4 The Court has consistently held that
fundamental rights form an integral part of Community law.85
The Court is bound to safeguard these rights, and cannot up-
hold national measures that are incompatible with them.8 6
To determine what constitutes a fundamental right, the
Court of Justice considers the "constitutional traditions com-
mon to the Member States" as well as international treaties
signed by the Member States.8 7 The Court attaches "special
84. See, e.g., Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case 44/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3727,
3744-45, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 42, 64 (finding viniculturist with right to property claim
based on German Constitution nevertheless may be prohibited by Community law
from planting additional vines); Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, Case 36/75, [1975]
E.C.R. 1219, 1236, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 140, 158; Nold v. Commission, [1974] E.C.R.
491, 507, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 338, 354; IHG, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, 1134,
[1972] C.M.L.R. 255, 283.
In Rutili, the Court ofJustice emphasized that "an appraisal of whether measures
designed to safeguard public policy must have regard to all Community law," includ-
ing Article 10 of the Human Rights Convention. Rutili, [1975] E.C.R. at 1236, [1976]
1 C.M.L.R. at 158. The Court stated that no restrictions based on public policy shall
be placed on the rights guaranteed by that article other than those which are justified
by the interests in a democratic society. Id.; see Joseph Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust:
Some Questions Concerning the Role of the European Court ofJustice in the Protection of Funda-
mental Human Rights Within the Legal Order of the European Communities, 61 WASH. L. REV.
1103, 1105 (1986).
85. See, e.g., Hauer, [1979] E.C.R. at 3744-45, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 64; Rutili,
[1975] E.C.R. at 1232, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. at 151; Nold, [1974] E.C.R. at 507, [1974] 2
C.M.L.R. at 354; IHG, [1970] E.C.R. at 1134, [1972] C.M.L.R. at 283; see also Brian
Walsh (Judge of Irish Supreme Court), Reflections on the Effects of Membership of the Euro-
pean Communities in Irish Law, in Du DRorr INTERNATIONAL AU DROIT DE L'INTIGRATION,
805, 816 (F. Capotorti et al. eds., 1986) (quoting 1976 statement by Judge Pescatore
that guarantee of fundamental rights is integral part of general principles of Commu-
nity law). Judge Pescatore urged a common approach by the Community to funda-
mental rights, noting that "[a]ny attempt, at national level, to impose this protection
unilaterally will inevitably result in weakening the Community system and destroy its
unity. And ... it is not in the interests of our States." Id. at 817.
86. Nold, [1974] E.C.R. at 507, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 354.
87. S.E.A., supra note 2, OJ. L 169/1, at 1 (1987); see Nold, [1974] E.C.R. at 507,
[1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 354; IHG, [1970] E.C.R. at 1134, [1972] C.M.L.R. at 283.
The precise definition of "traditions common to" the Member States has not
been determined. The minimalist interpretation asserts that only rights that exist in
all Member States can be considered common to them. See STEINER, supra note 2, at
46. The maximalist approach points out that to avoid conflicts between the Commu-
nity and all the Member States, any human right recognized in any Member State
must be reflected in Community law. Id. It is important to note that the S.E.A.
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significance" to the Human Rights Convention, which is ex-
pressly recognized in the preamble to the Single European
Act.88 The provisions of the Human Rights Convention do not
have direct effect in the Member States; rather, the Court of
Justice uses them to help determine general principles that it
may then apply.89 The Court may only apply these general
principles of fundamental rights to cases within the scope of
the Treaty.90 The Court does not have the power to examine
the validity of purely national measures under the Human
Rights Convention."
B. The Development of Abortion Legislation in Ireland and in the
Community
Abortion has been prohibited in Ireland for centuries.
While Europe and the United States have liberalized abortion
laws, Ireland has maintained a total ban. In 1983, Ireland
passed the Eighth Amendment to its Constitution, which the
passed in Ireland by referendum, and thereby became part of the Constitution. See
Walsh, supra note 85, at 820. The population passed the referendum with full knowl-
edge of the possible implications to Irish law, and amid much commentary and polit-
ical debate warning that the passage of the S.E.A. could lead to the legalization of
abortion even within Ireland's borders. Id. at 814-15.
88. S.E.A., supra note 2, O.J. L 169/1, at 1 (1987); Opinion of Advocate General
Van Gerven, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan,
Case C-159/90, [1991] E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 539, 567.
Ireland is a party to the Human Rights Convention, but the Convention was not
incorporated into Irish domestic law. See JAMES CASEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN IRE-
LAND 172 (1987). Therefore, a party cannot rely on the Convention in Irish courts.
Id. However, the passage of the S.E.A. incorporates the Human Rights Convention
into Ireland's domestic law, where Community law is implicated, almost as if it had
been directly enacted into Irish domestic law. See John Temple Lang, European Com-
munity Law, Irish Law and the Irish Legal Profession: Protection of the Individual and Co-
Operation Between the Member States and the Community, 5 DUBLIN U. L.J. 1, 3 (1983); see
also, CASEY, supra, at 177-78.
89. See Lang, supra note 88, at 2-3; see also Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case
44/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3727, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 42 (finding Community law overrides
national constitutional provision); Minister for Fisheries v. Schoenberg, Case 88/77,
[1978] E.C.R. 473, 490, [1978] 2 C.M.L.R. 519, 525 (holding Article 7 of Treaty,
prohibiting discrimination based on residence or nationality, to have direct effect).
But see STEINER, supra note 2, at 31 (noting inconsistencies in Court of Justice's case
law regarding direct effect of international agreements).
90. Demirel v. Stadt Schwabisch Gmiind, Case 12/86, [1987] E.C.R. 3719, 3754,
[1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 421, 440-41.
91. Id. The Court stated that it "has no power to examine the compatibility with
the European Convention on Human Rights of national legislation lying outside the
scope of Community law." Id.
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Irish Supreme Court interpreted as providing more rigid
prohibitions not only against abortion, but against information
regarding abortion.9 2
1. Early History of Ireland's Laws Restricting Abortion
Abortion has long been outlawed in Ireland. At common
law, abortion was a misdemeanor. 93 In 1803, the United King-
dom enacted a statute, which applied to Ireland, that imposed
the death penalty on one who administered poison with the
intent to induce the miscarriage of a pregnant woman.94 In
1861, the United Kingdom passed the Offenses Against the
Person Act,95 which substantially continues in force in Ireland
today.96 Section 58 of the Offenses Against the Person Act
makes it a felony for a woman to attempt to induce her own
miscarriage, or for anyone to perform an abortion on her. 7
Under section 59, anyone who supplies the means to terminate
92. IR. CONST. art. 40.3.3; see infra notes 129-39, 163-76 and accompanying text
(discussing cases in which Irish Supreme Court interpreted Eighth Amendment
strictly).
93. See Attorney General ex rel. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children
(Ireland) Ltd. v. Open Door Counselling Ltd., 1988 I.R. 593, 597 (Ir. H. Ct.). The
common law prohibition applied when the fetus had "quickened" in the uterus. Id.;
see John Quinlan, Note, Right to Life of the Unborn-An Assessment of the Eighth Amendment
to the Irish Constitution, 1984 B.Y.U. L. REv. 371, 371-72.
94. 43 Geo. 3, ch. 58 (1803) (Eng.). The statute also provided that one who
administered the abortifacient with the intent to induce the miscarriage of any wo-
man, whether or not she was actually pregnant, was guilty of a felony punishable by
imprisonment or transportation for fourteen years. Id.
95. 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 100, §§ 58-59 (1861) (Eng.). The Act specified that it
applied to Ireland. Id.
96. See BRIAN DooLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND RIGHTS IN IRELAND 2 n.3
(1984). The Irish Free State was founded in 1921, and the first Constitution was
established one year later. Id. The present Constitution was approved by plebiscite
in 1937. Id. at 2-4. The Offenses Against the Person Act did not conflict with the
Irish Constitution and was never repealed. See Quinlan, supra note 93, at 372.
97. Offenses Against the Person Act, 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 100, § 58 (1861). Sec-
tion 58 of the Act provides that
[e]very Woman being with Child, who with Intent to procure her own Mis-
carriage, shall unlawfully administer to herself any Poison or other noxious
Thing, or shall unlawfully use any Instrument or other Means whatsoever
with the like Intent, and whosoever, with the Intent to procure the Miscar-
riage of any Woman, whether she be or not with Child, shall [administer to
her anything with like intent] . . . shall be guilty of a felony, and being con-
victed thereof, shall be liable, at the Discretion of the Court, to be kept in
Penal Servitude for Life ... or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding
Two Years.
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a pregnancy knowing it will be used for that purpose is guilty
of a misdemeanor.98 There have been, however, few prosecu-
tions under the Offenses Against the Person Act. 99
The Irish legislature affirmed its support for the Offenses
Against the Person Act in 1979 with the passage of the Health
(Family Planning) Act (the "Health Act").'0 0 The Health Act
asserts the illegality of abortion and upholds the prohibitions
established by sections 58 and 59 of the Offenses Against the
Person Act.' 0 ' The Health Act also prohibits the sale, importa-
tion, manufacture, advertisement, or display of abortifacients
in Ireland.10 2 Ireland's continuing restriction of abortion is an
anomaly in the European Community.1 0 3
2. The Effect of Europe's Abortion Laws on Ireland
The legalization of abortion in the United Kingdom raised
fears among some in Ireland that abortion would also become
legal in Ireland.0 4 In the United Kingdom, a liberalization of
98. Id. § 59. Section 59 of the Offenses Against the Person Act provides that
[w]hosoever shall unlawfully supply or procure any Poison or other noxious
Thing or any Instrument or Thing whatsoever knowing that the same is in-
tended to be unlawfully used or employed with Intent to procure the Mis-
carriage of any Woman, whether she be or not with Child, shall be guilty of a
Misdemeanor, and being convicted thereof shall be liable . .. to imprison-
ment for any term not exceeding two years.
Id.
99. See Quinlan, supra note 93, at 374 n.15 (citing P.JACKSON, THE DEADLY SOLU-
TION TO AN IRISH PROBLEM-BACKSTREET ABORTION 2 (1983) (published by Women's
Right to Choose Campaign)) (noting that there have been 58 illegal abortion cases
investigated or tried in Ireland between 1926 and 1974).
100. Pub. Gen. Acts, no. 20, § 10 (1979) (Ir.). Section 10 of the Health Act
provides that
[niothing in this Act shall be construed as authorising-
(a) The procuring of abortion,
(b) the doing of any other thing the doing of which is prohibited by Section
58 or 59 of the Offenses Against the Person Act, 1861 (which sections
prohibit the administering of drugs or the use of instruments to procure
abortion or the supplying of drugs or instruments to procure abortion)
or
(c) the sale, importation into the State, manufacture, advertising or display
of abortifacients.
Id.
101. Id. § 10(c).
102. Id.
103. See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text (discussing abortion laws in
Europe).
104. See Glenn Frankel, A Divided Ireland, WASH. PosT, Jan. 8, 1990, at A18 (stat-
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abortion laws took place while the Offenses Against the Person
Act was still in effect. As early as 1937, an English court held
that because sections 58 and 59 prohibited not "abortion" but
"unlawful abortion," there existed the possibility of lawful
abortion." 5 Otherwise, the courtargued, the word "unlawful"
would have been superfluous. 0 6 This interpretation of the Of-
fenses Against the Person Act suggested that the Act's lan-
guage might not be sufficient to prevent abortion in Ireland
either. 107
In 1967, the U.K. Parliament passed the Abortion Act.' 08
The Abortion Act provides that a doctor may legally terminate
a pregnancy within the first twelve weeks if the pregnancy
could cause injury to the physical or mental health of the preg-
nant woman or her family.' 0 9 In addition, abortion is legal un-
til viability if there is a substantial risk of severe fetal abnormal-
ity.110 The United Kingdom's early move to liberalize abortion
laws was soon reflected throughout continental Europe.
Developments in continental Europe also influenced polit-
ical change in Ireland."' In the 1970s and 1980s, most Mem-
ber States passed laws legalizing abortion under certain cir-
cumstances." 2 By 1989, when Belgium legalized abortion,
ing that anti-abortion groups "grew alarmed after Britain eased its abortion restric-
tions in 1967.").
105. Rex v. Bourne, [1939] 1 K.B. 687, 691; see Offenses Against the Person Act,
24 & 25 Vict., ch. 100, §§ 58-59 (Eng.). In Bourne, an obstetrician who performed an
abortion on a 14-year-old rape victim was prosecuted under the Act and found inno-
cent. Id. at 688, 696. Supporters of the current anti-abortion amendment in Ireland
feared an attempt to test the existing Irish law in the courts using a sensational case.
See VICKY RANDALL, The Politics of Abortion in Ireland, in THE NEW POLITICS OF ABOR-
TION 68 (Lori Lovenduski & Joyce Outshoorn eds. 1986).
106. Bourne, [1939] 1 K.B. at 691.
107. See Frankel, supra note 104, at A18 (stating that Offenses Against Person
Act was not strong enough in the opinion of anti-abortion groups).
108. Abortion Act, ch. 87 (1967) (Eng.).
109. Id.
110. Id. A severely handicapped fetus can be aborted until viability, set at 24
weeks. Id.
111. See William Binchy, The Need for a Constitutional Amendment, in ABORTION AND
LAW 116 (A. Flannery ed., 1983) (observing that Ireland does not exist in "cultural
vacuum" and trend throughout Europe is to liberalize abortion laws); see also Randall,
supra note 105, at 70 (stating that proponents of amendment considered admission
to Community to be threat to Ireland's existing prohibition of abortion).
112. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW
10-62 & app. A-B (1987); Abortion Laws in Europe, 18 PLANNED PARENTHOOD IN EUROPE
I (Supp. 1989). Most Member States express in their laws that efforts must be made
1991-1992]
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only Ireland maintained a total ban. 1 3 Despite the differing
views among the Member States of continental Europe, all give
women access to legal abortion." t4 The Community, except
for Ireland, has reached the consensus that women have the
right to control the size of their families to some extent
through the availability of safe, legal abortion. Isolated in its
ban on abortion, Ireland feared that the Community trend to-
ward liberalization would soon be reflected in its own laws." 15
3. Modern Abortion Law in Ireland
Social changes within Ireland also suggested that Irish
laws prohibiting abortion might change unless they were more
strongly articulated." 6 For example, a 1971 Irish Supreme
to prevent unwanted pregnancies and to encourage women to carry the fetus to term.
See, e.g., Law No. 75-17 (1975), J.O. Jan. 18, 1975, at 739, amended by Law No. 79-
1204 (1979), J.O. Jan. 1, 1980, at 3 (Fr.) (stating its respect of every human being
from commencement of life and requiring two consultations and waiting period); see
also Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven, Society for the Protection of Unborn
Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan, Case C-159/90, [1991] E.C.R. -, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 539, 558.In the Member States with more lenient abortion laws, the woman ultimately
decides if she will have an abortion in the first trimester. GLENDON, supra, at 21. Most
of these Member States allow abortion on demand during the first ten to twelve
weeks depending on varying national requirements for medical consultation, coun-
selling, and a mandatory waiting period before obtaining an abortion. Id. at 14-21.
Thereafter, a doctor or committee of doctors must certify the reason for the abor-
tion. Id. In contrast, the Member States with stricter abortion laws give the doctor,
not the woman, the power to make the final determination of whether or not an
abortion is justified. Id. at 21. However, social ambivalence in some countries often
causes practice to diverge from the law in the area of abortion. See Jodi Jacobson,
Abortion in a New Light, WORLD WATCH 31, 37 (Mar.-Apr. 1990). For example, in
some regions of Germany, women have difficulty finding doctors willing to perform
an abortion at any stage of pregnancy, despite the law that permits abortion. Id.
113. See Kellaway, Baudouin's Day Off-The Monarchy, FIN. TIMES, June 18, 1990,
at 31. The circumstances under which Belgium passed its abortion law demonstrate
the personal and political turmoil which surrounds the issue in both Europe and the
United States. In April 1990, King Baudouin of Belgium abdicated his throne for 39
hours to allow a bill legalizing abortion in the first twelve weeks of pregnancy if the
woman is "in a state of distress" to be enacted without his approval. Id.
114. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text (discussing abortion laws in
Europe).
115. See Randall, supra note 105, at 68 (discussing fears of Pro Life Amendment
Campaign that led to amendment campaign).
116. See id. at 71. Abortion "must be seen as one of a number of moral issues
that call into question the authority of traditional Catholic values in Ireland" which
had eroded in other areas. Id.
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Court decision, McGee v. Attorney General," 17 increased the avail-
ability of contraceptives. Moreover, statistics showed an in-
crease in the number of Irish women traveling to England for
abortions, suggesting a growing acceptance of abortion as a
solution to unwanted pregnancy. 1 8
In 1981, a group of Irish activists formed an organization,
the Pro Life Amendment Committee ("PLAC"), to stem what
it considered a trend toward legalization of abortion in Ire-
land. 1" PLAC considered a constitutional amendment the
117. 1974 I.R. 284 (Ir. S.C.). Trends in the United States have also influenced
Irish opinions. See Binchy, supra note 111, at 121. U.S. constitutional law has had
considerable influence on Irish judges. Id.; see O'Brien v. Stoutt, 1984 I.R. 316, 325
(Ir. H. Ct.), aftd, 1984 I.R 326 (Ir. S.C.) (stating that "[d]ecisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States will always be received in this Court with the greatest of
respect.").
In the United States, the reform of abortion laws was based on the constitutional
right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973). The liberalizing trend began, as it would in Ireland, with the recognition of
the right to privacy for married couples regarding contraception. Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that law prohibiting use of contraceptives by
married persons violates "right of marital privacy"). In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972), the Supreme Court extended the availability of contraception to unmar-
ried people. Eisenstadt and Griswold laid the groundwork for the U.S. Supreme
Court's landmark decision, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe v. Wade recog-
nized the right of women to choose to have an abortion during the first trimester but
left the regulation of later abortion to the states. Id. at 163. This deference to the
U.S. Supreme Court was expressed in McGee, the Irish Supreme Court case making
contraception available in Ireland, which cited both Eisenstadt and Griswold. McGee,
1974 I.R. at 319. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade "was
one of the elements in the move to amend the Irish Constitution to protect 'unborn
life.' " Walsh, supra note 85, at 817.
118. SeeJ.R. Ashton, The Impact of the Hamilton Ruling [Open Door Counsel-
ling] on the Health of Irish Women 6 (May 1990) (on file with Fordham International
Law Journal); see also Open Door Counselling Ltd. and Dublin Well Woman Centre
Ltd. v. Ireland, Joined Cases 14234-35/88, slip op. at 9 (Eur. Comm'n H.R. Mar. 7,
1991) (estimating that over 3,500 women travel each year to England for abortion).
Actual figures are much higher because many Irish women give false English ad-
dresses. See Ashton, supra.
On the other hand, there is often a dichotomy between the consciousness of
women and the tenets of the dominant religion. See UNITED NATIONS, DEP'T OF INT'L
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, POPULATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS; PROCEEDINGS OF
THE EXPERT GROUP MEETING ON POPULATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 3-6 APRIL 1989,
U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.R/177, at 120 (1990). The dominant religion of a nation
has a considerable impact on public decisions of that nation, but does not affect the
consciousness of women to the same degree. Id. The result of this inconsistency
significantly increases the incidence of illegal abortion in countries where the domi-
nant religion is opposed to abortion. Id. In the case of Ireland, however, the result is
more often flight to countries that permit abortion. See Ashton, supra.
119. The Pro Life Amendment Campaign (PLAC) was founded on April 28,
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best way to prevent the legalization of abortion in Ireland. 120
PLAC mounted a two-year campaign during an unusual polit-
ical period which witnessed three general elections. 12  Hesi-
tant to offend the 95 percent Catholic constituency during a
close race, 122 all three major political parties announced sup-
port for a constitutional amendment within three weeks of
PLAC's formation. 23 In September 1983, following a national
referendum, 24  the legislature ratified the Eighth Amend-
ment. 
25
The Eighth Amendment to the Irish Constitution provides
that "[t]he State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn
and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother,
guarantees in its laws to respect, and as far as practicable, by its
laws to defend and vindicate that right."'126 The amendment
does not acknowledge the absolute right to life of the fetus.
Rather, that right is limited by the equal right of the mother,
and by other unspecified situations where protecting the fetus
would not be "practicable."'127 Despite the somewhat ambigu-
1981. See Kevin Boyle, An Insult to the Constitution, in THE ABORTION REFERENDUM, THE
CASE AGAINST 28 (Arnold & Kirby eds. 1982). PLAC was an umbrella organization
for thirteen organizations, several of which were associated with the Catholic Church.
See Randall, supra note 105, at 71. On the eve of the national referendum, SPUC, a
radical organization which sought to promote grass roots support, was invited to join
PLAC. Id. at 70. PLAC asserted that a constitutional amendment would both pre-
vent the legislature from legalizing abortion and stop the judiciary from interpreting
liberally the Offenses Against the Person Act. See Quinlan, supra note 93, at 371; see
also Randall, supra note 105, at 68 (stating that "[t]he principal declared objective of
the pro-amendment campaigners was to prevent the legalization of abortion inside
Ireland").
120. See Binchy, supra note 11, at 117 (noting concern that legal protection of
fetus was inadequate without amendment).
121. See Randall, supra note 105, at 73.
122. See id. at 72 (noting that given narrow electoral margin and overwhelmingly
Catholic electorate, few politicians would condone legal abortion).
123. See Boyle, supra note 119, at 29 (stating that by May 15, 1981 political par-
ties Fine Gael and Fianna Fail had committed themselves to amendment and Labour
had given general assent).
124. See Mary Ann Glendon, Irish Family Law in Comparative Perspective, 9 DUBLIN
U. L.J. 1 (1987). Under the Irish Constitution, an amendment must be submitted to
the Dil as a bill. IR. CONST. art. 46. The bill must pass both legislative houses and be
submitted to the people for a referendum. Id. Voter turnout, usually 70 percent or
more, was low at 54 percent. See Quinlan, supra note 93, at 390.
125. IR. CONST. art. 40.3.3; see CASEY, supra note 88, at 28 (discussing passage of
amendment).
126. IR. CONST. art. 40.3.3.
127. Id.
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ous wording of the amendment, the legislature has not passed
any law pursuant to it and its interpretation has been left to the
courts.
28
Attorney General ex rel. Society for the Protection of Unborn Chil-
dren v. Open Door Counselling'2 9 first tested the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the scope of the Eighth Amendment with re-
gard to the provision of information about abortion.13 0  In
Open Door Counselling, the defendant clinics provided to preg-
nant women services that included counselling on the alterna-
tives and assistance available to them.' One of the options
discussed in the cases of unwanted pregnancy was the possibil-
ity of abortion.' 3 2 If a woman wished to consider the abortion
alternative further, the clinics would generally refer her to a
qualified facility in England. 3 3 The Irish clinics examined in
advance the facilities to which they referred women to ensure
that their clients would receive responsible advice and quality
care. 3 4 The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children
("SPUC") sought an injunction to halt the counselling. 3 5
SPUC asserted that the clinics' activities were a "conspiracy to
corrupt public morals" and unlawful under the Eighth Amend-
ment.13 6 The clinics, on the other hand, asserted that they had
a right to expression guaranteed by the Human Rights Con-
vention. 3 7
The Supreme Court of Ireland held in Open Door Counsel-
ling that the right to freedom of expression must yield to the
fetus' "right to life."' 3 M According to the Court, the Eighth
128. See Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan,
1989 I.R. 760, 770 (Ir. S.C.); see, CASEY, supra note 88, at 313-14.
129. 1988 I.R. 618 (Ir. S.C.).
130. Id.
131. Attorney General ex rel. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ire-
land) Ltd. v. Open Door Counselling Ltd., 1988 I.R. 593, 600-601 (Ir. H. Ct.), af'd in
part, rev'd in part, 1988 I.R. 618 (Ir. S.C.).
132. Id. at 601.
133. Id. at 600.
134. Id. at 601.
135. Id. at 600.
136. Id.; see James Friedman, On the Dangers of Moral Certainty and Sacred Trusts, 10
DUBLIN U. LJ. 71, 72 (1988).
137. Attorney General ex rel. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ire-
land) Ltd. v. Open Door Counselling Ltd., 1988 I.R. 593, 605 (Ir. H. Ct.), afd in part,
rev'd in part, 1988 I.R. 618 (Ir. S.C.); see also Human Rights Convention, supra note 6,
art. 10(1).
138. Open Door Counselling, 1988 I.R. at 617.
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Amendment not only forbids the medical termination of preg-
nancy, but also bars spoken and written information regarding
the specifics of its availability outside of Ireland. 39 Although
the case was still on appeal with the European Court on
Human Rights, 140 SPUC aimed the new Irish Supreme Court
holding at others who were disseminating information about
legal abortion.' 4 '
II. SOCIETY FOR THE PROTECTION OF UNBORN
CHILDREN (IRELAND) LTD. v. GROGAN
In a move designed to ban in Ireland any information re-
garding the availability of abortion services in other Member
States, SPUC sued the members of several student organiza-
tions. 142 The students published and distributed handbooks,
free of charge, that contained information regarding alterna-
tives available to pregnant women which included keeping the
child, adoption, foster care and methods for communicating
with facilities in England that provide abortion services. 14 3
SPUC sought to enjoin the students' distribution of the infor-
mation, arguing that it assisted women to terminate pregnancy
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 144
139. Id.
140. Open Door Counselling Ltd. and Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd. v. Ire-
land,Joined Cases 14234-35/88, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n H.R. Mar. 7, 1991). The case
was appealed to the European Court of Human Rights to resolve the conflict of
rights. Id. On March 7, 1991, the European Commission of Human Rights deter-
mined that Ireland had violated Article 10(1) of the Human Rights Convention. Id.
slip op. at 13; see supra note 6 for text of Article 10 of the Human Rights Convention.
141. See, e.g., Society for the Protection of Unborn Children v. Coogan, 1989
I.R. 738 (Ir. S.C.) (finding that SPUC's bona fide interest in abortion justified stand-
ing); see also Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan,
Case C-159/90, [1991] E.C.R. -, -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 539,
581; Frankel, supra note 104, at A18. SPUC's president, Mary Lucey, said that "[w]e
don't want to stop anyone's right to travel, even if to go get an abortion ... [b]ut a
woman has no right to information that will help her kill her unborn child." Id.
142. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan,
1989 I.R. 760, 761 (Ir. S.C.). A question arose regarding SPUC's standing to bring
this case on its own behalf, rather than to bring'it with the Irish Attorney General as it
had in Open Door Counselling, 1988 I.R. 618. See CASEY, supra note 88, at 313 n.10a.
The Supreme Court, however, took the appeal based on its recent holding in Coogan,
1989 I.R. 738. Grogan, [1989] I.R. at 761. The defendants were elected officers of
three groups: the Union of Students in Ireland, the Students' Union of University
College Dublin, and the Students' Union of Trinity College Dublin. Id.
143. Grogan, 1989 I.R. at 766-67.
144. Id. at 761.
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The students, on the other hand, argued that Irish nation-
als had a right under Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty to travel
to another Member State to receive medical services lawfully
provided there.'4 5 As a corollary to that right, the students as-
serted, Irish nationals had a right to know about the existence
of medical services available in other Member States. 146 The
students concluded that the right to receive information re-
garding services available in other Member States must be sup-
ported by a corresponding right to impart such information. ' 47
Such an interpretation, moreover, would be consistent with the
Human Rights Convention.148
A. Proceedings at the National Level
The Irish High Court 149 found that it was unable to decide
Grogan until the Court of Justice resolved the questions of
Community law presented by the students. 15 0 The High Court
defined the issue presented in the case as whether the right to
receive information gives rise to a corresponding right to im-
part information.'' The High Court distinguished Open Door
Counselling on the ground that the students in Grogan had
merely published information without assisting in the procure-
ment of an abortion. 152
To resolve the questions of Community law, the High
Court referred questions to the Court of Justice for a prelimi-
nary ruling pursuant to Article 177 of the Treaty' 53 and re-
fused to issue an interlocutory injunction to prevent the publi-
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See supra note 6 (quoting Article 10 of Human Rights Convention).
149. See CASEY, supra note 88, at 223 (noting that Irish High Court is court of
first instance); see also IR. CONST. art. 34.1.
150. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan
1989 I.R. 753, 758 (Ir. H. Ct.), a/f'd in part, rev'd in part, 1989 I.R. 760 (Ir. S.C.).
151. Id. at 758. The High Court stated that "if there is a right to receive infor-
mation, there must be a corresponding right to give it, and that is the issue which
arises in this case." Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. Article 177 of the Treaty provides that "any national court or tribunal"
may refer prejudgment questions to the Court ofJustice in order to clarify Commu-
nity law if the national court considers that a decision on the question is necessary to
enable it to give judgement. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177. Upon receiving an
answer, the national court must then apply Community law as articulated by the
Court of Justice to the facts in the case before it. Article 177 provides in part that
1991-1992]
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cation of the handbooks. 54 The first question referred to the
Court ofJustice addressed the definition of the term "services"
under Article 60 of the Treaty. 55 The second and third ques-
tions addressed the existence of specific rights of the students
under Community law to distribute information regarding
abortion.' 56
SPUC appealed to the Supreme Court, seeking an inter-
locutory injunction pending the decision of the Court of Jus-
tice. 5 7 It also requested a declaration that the students' publi-
cation, insofar as it specified clinics in England, violated the
Eighth Amendment. 58 The Supreme Court took the appeal,
despite the students' argument that the High Court had not
[t]he Court ofJustice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings con-
cerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of the acts of the institutions of the Com-
munity;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the
Council, where those statutes so provide.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177.
154. Grogan, 1989 I.R. at 758.
155. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan,
Case C-159/90, [1991] E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 539, 577.
The first question read: "Does the organised activity or process of carrying out an
abortion or the medical termination of pregnancy come within the definition of
"services" provided for in art. 60 of the [EEC Treaty]?" Id. at -, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC at 542.
156. Id. The second and third questions read:
2. In the absence of any measures providing for the approximation of
the laws of member states concerning the organised activity or process of
carrying out an abortion or the medical termination of pregnancy, can a
member state prohibit the distribution of specific information about the
identity, location and means of communication with a specified clinic or clin-
ics in another member state where abortions are performed?
3. Is there a right at Community law in a person in member state A to
distribute specific information about the identity, location and means of
communication with a specified clinic or clinics in member state B where
abortions are performed, where the provision of abortion is prohibited
under both the constitution and the criminal law of member state A but is
lawful under certain conditions in member state B?
Id. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [19911 2 CEC at 542-43.
157. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan,
1989 I.R. 760, 760-61 (Ir. S.C.).
158. Id. at 761. The defendants requested that
a declaration that any publication published or distributed under the aegis
of the defendants which contains information calculated to inform persons
(including pregnant women) of the identity and location of and method of
communication with a specified clinic or clinics where abortions are per-
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made an appealable decision. 5 9 The Supreme Court found
that the High Court had made two "decisions": one to refer
questions to the Court of Justice, and another not to issue the
injunction. 6 ' The Supreme Court left the referral unal-
tered,' 6' but asserted that the failure to issue an interlocutory
injunction was an appealable decision.' 6 2
In examining the merits of the case, the Supreme Court
refused to distinguish Grogan from Open Door Counselling.l63
Therefore, according to the Supreme Court, the High Court's
failure to issue an interlocutory injunction changed the status
quo established in Open Door Counselling."6 The High Court
erred, according to the Supreme Court, by neglecting to apply
the clearly established rule prohibiting the dissemination of in-
formed is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of Ireland and in
particular Article 40.3.3 [the Eighth Amendment] thereof.
Id.
159. Id. at 762.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 763. The Court admonished the attempt by the Irish High Court to
postpone action until the Court ofJustice had rendered its preliminary ruling. Id. at
767-68. In accepting the appeal, the Irish Supreme Court stated that the High Court
does not have "free and untrammelled power" to forestall a decision that can be
made based on national law. Id. at 768.
162. Id. at 762-63. The students argued that the Supreme Court had no juris-
diction because the High Court had not yet handed down a "decision," only an Arti-
cle 177 referral. Id. at 762. On the basis of the Irish Supreme Court decision in
Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister for Industry and Commerce, 1983 I.R. 82 (Ir. S.C.), they
argued that an Article 177 referral was not appealable. Society for the Protection of
Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan, 1989 I.R. 760, 760-61 (Ir. S.C.). The
Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction in Grogan, however, noting that "no mere ab-
sence of formal words from a High Court order could be permitted to remove from
the appellate jurisdiction of [the Supreme Court] a determination of a High Court
judge which affects one of the parties involved and has all the characteristics of a
decision." Id. at 763.
163. Grogan, 1989 I.R. at 764.
164. Id. The Supreme Court stated that
[t]his application for an interlocutory injunction, therefore, consists of an
application to restrain an activity which has been clearly declared by this
Court to be unconstitutional [in Attorney General ex rel Society for the Pro-
tection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Open Door Counselling Ltd.,
1988 I.R. 618] and therefore unlawful and which could assist and is in-
tended to assist in the destruction of the right to life of an unborn child, a
right acknowledged and protected under the Constitution.
Grogan, 1989 I.R. at 764-65. The Court dismissed the students' argument that the
information contained in the booklets had already been distributed in various ways
prior to the suit, making distribution the status quo ante to be maintained. Id. at 762.
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formation regarding legal abortion.t 65
In balancing the rights of the fetus against competing
rights, the Supreme Court asserted that no Community law re-
garding services could outweigh the rights guaranteed the fe-
tus by Ireland's Constitution. 66 The Court noted that "where
the right sought to be protected is that of a life, there can be
no question of a possible or putative right which might exist in
European law as a corollary to the right to travel so as to avail
of services."'' 67 This view suggested that even if the Court of
Justice were to find that Ireland's law conflicted with a "funda-
mental pillar"'' 68 of Community law, the Supreme Court would
subject the Treaty to Ireland's constitutional provisions. 69
The Irish Supreme Court's statement is completely contrary to
the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice regarding the
supremacy of Community law.' 70
165. Grogan, 1989 I.R. at 762.
166. Id. at 765.
167. Id.
168. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3.
169. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan,
1989 I.R. 760, 768 (Ir. S.C.). In his opinion, Justice Walsh added that
[ilt has been sought to be argued in the present case that the effect of the
amendment of Article 29 of the Constitution, which was necessary to permit
our adhesion to the treaties of the European Communities, is to qualify all
rights including fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The
Eighth Amendment of the Constitution is subsequent in time, by several
years, to the amendment of Article 29. That fact may give rise to the consid-
eration of the question of whether or not the Eighth Amendment itself qual-
ifies the amendment to Article 29 .... [A]ny answer to the reference re-
ceived from the Court of Justice of the European Communities will have to
be considered in the light of our own constitutional provisions. In the last
analysis only this Court can decide finally what are the effects of the interac-
tion of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution and the Third Amend-
ment of the Constitution.
Id. at 768-69.
170. See supra note 2 and accompanying (discussing supremacy of Community
law); see also, IHG, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, 1134, [1972] C.M.L.R. 255, 283.
In IHG, the Court stated that
the validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member State
cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental
rights as formulated by the constitution of that State or the principles of a
national constitutional structure.
Id.
But see Battle of Maastricht, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 29, 1992, at 55. Ireland inserted
a special protocol in the proposed Maastricht Treaty on European Union, due to be
voted on by referendum in Ireland this year. Id. It reads:
Nothing in the Treaty on European Union or in the treaties establishing the
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Moreover, the Supreme Court questioned whether abor-
tion could even be considered a "service" given that it is
"manifestly contrary" to the public morality as well as "de-
structive of the most fundamental of all human rights."' 7 ' The
Supreme Court asserted that just because "grossly immoral"
activities may be permitted in other Member States, those ac-
tivities do not necessarily fall within the sphere of Community
law.' 7 2 The Supreme Court concluded that a Member State
should not be obliged to permit activities designed to under-
mine guarantees for the protection of a fundamental human
right. 73
Despite its discussion of the fundamental rights of the fe-
tus, the Supreme Court failed to address the substance of the
European Communities or in the treaties or acts modifying or supplement-
ing those treaties shall affect the application in Ireland of (the Eighth
Amendment] of the constitution of Ireland.
Id.
Because the protocol specifies the application of the law "in Ireland," commentators
suggest that the protocol is intended to ensure that Community law could not be
invoked in the future to allow abortion in Ireland. Id. Regarding the meaning of the
protocol, former Taoiseach Charles Haughey allegedly assured Community heads of
state that the Irish Constitution did not prevent woment from traveling to other
Member States for medical services legal in those countries. Sam Smythe, Girl's Fam-
ily Seeks Haughey EC Letter, IR. INDEPENDENT (Sunday ed.), Feb. 23, 1992, at 1.
Moreover, the Maastricht protocol may be contrary to Article 29.3.4 of the Irish
Constitution which provides, in relevant part, that
[n]o provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or
measures adopted by the State necessitated by the obligations of member-
ship of the Communities or prevents laws enacted, acts done or measures
adopted by the Communities, or institutions thereof, from having the force
of law in the State.
IR. CONST., art. 29.3.4.
171. Id. at 769. The Court dismissed the students' contention that the validity
of an interim relief to protect threatened directly effective Community rights was a
matter properly decided by the Court of Justice under the principles enunciated in
Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd., Case C-213/89,
[1990] E.C.R. 2433, [19901 3 C.M.L.R. 1. The Court maintained that the two cases
were distinguishable in that Factortame related to an injunction restraining an act of
Parliament, a form of relief which was prohibited by national law, while Grogan con-
cerned an injunction which was "not only consistent with but is in full accord with
[Ireland's Constitution]." Grogan, 1989 I.R. at 765. In granting the injunction, the
Court noted that "both the question as to the stage of the action in the member state
at which that reference is made and what steps ... the courts of the member state
may take . . . are peculiarly matters for the national courts to be considered and
decided in accordance with national law." Id. at 765-66.
172. Grogan, 1989 I.R. at 769.
173. Id.
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students' fundamental rights argument. Both Ireland and the
Community recognize that humans who are already born have
certain fundamental rights. 174 The students asserted that in
addition to the rights granted by the Treaty, they had a right to
impart information under Article 10(1) of the Human Rights
Convention. 175 The Supreme Court merely concluded that a
''procedural" Community law regarding the free movement of
services could not override the "fundamental" right to life of
the fetus. 176
The Supreme Court issued an interlocutory injunction
and allowed the Article 177 referral. 177  This injunction
banned the publication and distribution of information regard-
ing the availability of abortion pending the Court of Justice's
ruling. 178 The Supreme Court provided for a final resolution
of the case by the High Court following the answers deter-
mined by the Court of Justice. 179
B. Proceedings in the European Court of Justice
In addressing the first question regarding the qualification
of abortion as a service, 180 the Court ofJustice considered both
174. See Justice Brian Walsh, Foreword to CASEY, supra note 88, at viii (regarding
natural rights protected by Irish Constitution); see also supra notes 84-91 and accom-
panying text (discussing fundamental rights in Community law).
175. Human Rights Convention, supra note 6, art. 10(1). The Human Rights
Convention applies to the Community under the Treaty by virtue of the S.E.A..
S.E.A., supra note 2, pmbl., O.J. L 169/1 (1987). The European Court of Human
Rights does not recognize fetal rights. Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven,
Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan, Case C-159/
90, [1991] E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 539, 570-71; see Quin-
Ian, supra note 93, at 399-401 (discussing briefly all abortion cases which have come
before Court of Human Rights).
176. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan,
1989 I.R. 760, 766 (Ir. S.C.).
177. Id. at 761.
178. Grogan, [1991] E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC at 577.
179. Grogan, 1989 I.R. at 766.
180. See supra note 155 (presenting first question). The Court ofJustice accepted
jurisdiction of the case despite SPUC's argument that it did not fall within the scope
of the Treaty. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Gro-
gan, Case C-159/90, [1991] E.C.R. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC
539, 578. First, SPUC argued, the students did not distribute the information in the
context of any economic activity, precluding application of the Treaty provisions re-
garding services. Id. Second, since the information was distributed within Ireland,
the case lacked the cross-border element requisite for application of the Treaty. Id.
The Court found that SPUC's arguments went to the heart of the questions referred
SPUC v. GROGAN
Article 60 and the case law interpreting it. Abortion qualifies
as a service under Article 60, the Court noted, because it is
normally provided for remuneration, and is not covered by
Treaty provisions relating to the free movement of goods, cap-
ital or persons. 18  Moreover, similar to its holding in Luisi and
Carbone, the Court of Justice in Grogan held that abortion satis-
fies the requirements of Article 60(d), which includes the activ-
ities of the professions, because it is a medical procedure per-
formed by doctors.' 82 The Court of Justice therefore dis-
missed SPUC's argument that a "grossly immoral" activity
could not qualify as a service, asserting that the characteriza-
tion of an activity as immoral by one Member State cannot be
imposed on another Member State that permits the activity.183
The Court concluded that abortion constitutes a service within
the meaning of the Treaty. 84
Finding that abortion is a service, the Court ofJustice then
considered the second and third questions, seeking to deter-
mine whether prohibiting the students from distributing infor-
mation regarding abortion conflicted with Community law.18 5
The Court asserted that the link between the activity of the stu-
dents' associations and the clinics in England was too tenuous
for a prohibition on the distribution of information to be re-
garded an obstruction to the free flow of services under the
Treaty. 186
Although the Court had never before required such a link,
it did not discuss the new requirement. The Court ofJustice in
by the High Court. Id. Therefore, while they could be considered in answering the
questions, they were not determinative of jurisdiction. Id.
181. Grogan, [1991] E.C.R. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC at
579.
182. Id.
183. Id. The Court of Justice noted that "[w]hatever the merits of those argu-
ments on a moral plane ... [i]t is not for the court [ofJustice] to substitute its assess-
ment for that of the legislature in those member states where the activities in ques-
tion are practised legally." Id.
184. Id. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC at 580.
185. Id.
186. Id. at .. , Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC at 579. Regarding Arti-
cle 59, the Court concluded, without discussion, that "the link between the activity of
the students' associations.., and medical terminations of pregnancies carried out in
clinics in another member state is too tenuous for the prohibition on the distribution
of information to be capable of being regarded as a restriction within the meaning of
art. 59 of the Treaty." Id.
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Grogan merely concluded that because the students did not act
on behalf of an economic operator, they could not appeal to
the Treaty for protection of their rights under Article 59.187
The Court distinguished GB-INNO, 188 the case cited in Advo-
cate General Van Gerven's opinion, t89 in which the Court held
that a prohibition on advertising obstructed the free move-
ment of goods in violation of the Treaty.' 90 In Grogan, the
Court noted that a link had existed between the advertiser and
the provider of goods in GB-INNO that did not exist in Gro-
gan.' 9 ' The Grogan Court's use of the word "link" with refer-
ence to GB-INNO is misleading because in GB-INNO the Court
noted the importance of the link between protecting the con-
sumer and providing the consumer with information. 92 The
GB-INNO Court did not mention the necessity of a link be-
tween the seller and the advertiser, but between the consumer
and the advertisement.' 9 The Grogan Court thus quoted GB-
INNO out of context, and never mentioned the importance of
information to the consumer which was stressed in the case.
The implications of the Court of Justice's conclusion that
the students did not qualify for Treaty protection were two-
fold. First, the Court of Justice did not need to apply Article
62, the standstill clause that prevents the imposition of any
new restrictions on services after the entry into force of the
Treaty. The Court noted that Article 62 works only in con-
junction with Article 59, and cannot prohibit restrictions which
do not fall within the scope of Article 59. t 94 Thus, the Court
did not have occasion to consider whether the ban on informa-
tion was a "new restriction" even though both the passage of
187. Id.
188. GB-INNO-BM, Case C-362/88, [1990] E.C.R. 667, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 801.
189. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan,
Case C-159/90, [1991] E.C.R .... Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] CEC 539,
558.
190. GB-INNO, [1990] E.C.R. at 689, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. at 816.
191. Grogan, [1991] E.C.R. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC at
578.
192. GB-INNO, [1990] E.C.R. at 688, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. at 815. The Court
stated that "[i]t should be observed first of all that Community policy on the subject
establishes a close link between protecting the consumer and providing the con-
sumer with information." Id.
193. Id.
194. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan,
[1991] E.C.R. -, -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 539, 580.
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the amendment and the Supreme Court's interpretation of it
occurred after the Treaty came into effect.' 95
Second, finding the students' activities to be outside the
scope of the Treaty relieved the Court ofjurisdiction to decide
the students' argument regarding the breach of their right to
freedom of expression under Article 10(1) of the Human
Rights Convention. 96 Since the its decision in Internationale
Handelgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und-Vorratsstelle, 197 the
Court of Justice has used the Human Rights Convention to
help determine the general principles of fundamental rights in
Community law. 19 In answering questions of Community law,
therefore, the Court is bound to consider the rights granted by
the Human Rights Convention.' 99 Where a case does not im-
plicate Community law, however, the Court of Justice will not
address the fundamental rights question.2 ° °
III. A BAN ON INFORMATION OBSTRUCTS THE
CREATION OF 'THE INTERNAL MARKET
The Court of Justice's judgment in Grogan hinders the de-
velopment of the internal market in two distinct ways. First,
the Court's failure to address the issue of access to information
as corollary to the right to receive services weakens one of the
fundamental pillars of the Community. As the Court held in
GB-INNO, an absence of information impedes access to serv-
195. Compare IR. CONST., art. 29.3.4 (noting accession of Ireland to EC) with
supra note 125 (noting passing of Eighth Amendment in 1983).
196. Grogan, [1991] E.C.R. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC at
580 (citing Elliniki Radiophonia Til6orassi-Anonimi Etairia (ERT-AE) v. Pliroforis-
sis Dimotiki Etairia (DEP), Case C-260/89 (Eur. Ct. J. June 18, 1991) (not yet re-
ported) [hereinafter ERT]). In ERT, the Court held that it must provide the national
court with all the elements of interpretation necessary to enable the national court to
determine the compatibility of national legislation with fundamental human rights as
provided in the European Convention on Human Rights. ERT, slip op. 42. How-
ever, the Grogan Court noted, a decision regarding the compatibility of national legis-
lation with fundamental rights is not necessary when, as here, the legislation is not
within the scope of the Treaty. Grogan, [1991] E.C.R. at -, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) [1991] 2 CEC at 580.
197. IHG, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, 1134, [1972] C.M.L.R. 255, 283.
198. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text (discussing fundamental
rights in Community law).
199. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (noting Court's obligation to ad-
dress fundamental rights issues).
200. See supra note 91 (discussing limit to Court's jurisdiction in area of funda-
mental rights).
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ices offered in other Member States to the detriment of intra-
Community trade. 20 1 Although not overruling GB-INNO, the
Court's failure to address the issue in Grogan nevertheless al-
lowed a ban on information for services to remain in effect.
Second, the failure of the Court of Justice to resolve the con-
flict of rights in Grogan undermines the law of fundamental
rights that the Court developed to ensure a unified Commu-
nity. Moreover, the Court left unchallenged the Irish Supreme
Court's suggestion that a subsequent domestic law can modify
Community law.20 2 Declining to confront the Irish Court's
misguided statement may ultimately lead to further contro-
versy.
A. A Ban on Information is Contrary to Specific Treaty Provisions
The freedom to provide services guaranteed by the Treaty
includes the right to travel to another Member State to receive
services there without obstruction. 0 3 This right is not, as the
Irish Supreme Court suggested, merely procedural. 2 4 The
free exchange of services is essential to the functioning of the
internal market.20 5 Trade in services is increasingly important
for a modern economy.20 6 By creating a dichotomy that slights
the area of services, the Court created a problem more far-
reaching than the one it sought to solve.
1. Access to Abortion Services Is Protected by the Treaty
The Court of Justice recognized abortion as a service
within the meaning of Article 60 because it is normally pro-
201. See GB-INNO-BM, Case C-362/88, [1990] E.C.R. 667, 689, [1991] 2
C.M.L.R. 801, 816; see also Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven, Society for the
Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan, Case C-159/90, [1991]
E.C.R. -, -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 539, 556.
202. See infra note 264 (discussing supremacy of Community law).
203. See supra notes 24-47 and accompanying text (discussing freedom to re-
ceive services).
204. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan,
1989 I.R. 760, 766 (Ir. S.C.).
205. See Italy v. Watson, Case 118/75, [1976] E.C.R. 1185, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R.
552. In Watson, an au pre entered Italy ostensibly as a tourist. Although the facts did
not support her claim that she was entitled to Treaty protection as a recipient of
services, the Court ofJustice recognized in dicta that the rules on the free movement
of both recipients and providers of services represent a fundamental principle that
must take precedence over national law. Id. at 1198, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at 572.
206. See Steindorff, supra note 23, at 353.
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vided for remuneration and involves the activities of the pro-
fessions. 20 7 The Court supported this conclusion by citing its
previous decision, Luisi and Carbone, in which medical services
were explicitly held to fall within the scope of Article 60.208
Having met the threshold requirements of Article 60, the
free access to abortion services is guaranteed by Article 59.
Unless it can justify derogation from the Treaty, no Member
State may obstruct the flow of services either directly, by re-
stricting the providers of the service, or indirectly by restrict-
ing the recipients. 20 9 Therefore, a woman traveling to England
for the purpose of receiving medical services to terminate a
pregnancy qualifies for Treaty protection as the recipient of a
service. 2  Absent a justified derogation from the provisions of
the Treaty, Ireland cannot restrict her movements. 2 "
2. Access to Information Should Be Corollary to the Right
to Receive Abortion Services
The Court of Justice recognizes that corollary rights are
necessary to protect the recipients of services. 12 In Luisi and
Carbone, for example, the Court recognized the right to transfer
capital as a corollary to the right to receive services.213 In that
case, the Court of Justice found that preventing an individual
207. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan,
Case C-159/90, [1991] E.C.R. -, -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 539,
579; see supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text (regarding Treaty provisions for
free movement of services).
208. Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro, Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83,
[1984] E.C.R. 377, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 52; see supra notes 32-47 and accompanying
text (discussing corollary right that attaches to freedom to receive services). More-
over, the Court agreed with the students' argument that the cross-border element
present in the case implicated Community law. Grogan, [1991] E.C.R. at -, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC at 577.
209. Service Directive, supra note 3, 0.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1963-1964, at 116
(1964).
210. Grogan, [1991] E.C.R. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC at
579.
211. See id.; see also Parliamentary Resolution, 0.J. C 106/113 (1991). The Euro-
pean Parliament's resolution concerned the actions of the German border police who
forced women suspected of having had abortions in the Netherlands to undergo gyn-
ecological exams. Parliament condemned the practice, concluding that the "Com-
munity's internal borders should not be used to threaten citizens with prosecution
for activities that are legal in some Member States but not in others." Id.
212. See supra notes 32-47 (discussing corollary rights).
213. See supra notes 32-38 (discussing Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero del
Tesoro, Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83, [1984] E.C.R. 377, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 52).
1991-19921
510 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 15:476
from paying for a service is tantamount to preventing that indi-
vidual from receiving that service. 1 4 Luisi and Carbone set the
precedent for the recognition of corollary rights as necessary
to guarantee the free flow of services.2 t5
Moreover, the Court of Justice recently recognized access
to information as an indispensable corollary to the free move-
ment of goods, an area closely analogous to services.21 6 The
Court asserted in GB-INNO that the provision of information
to the consumer is a "principal requirement" under Commu-
nity law.21 7 National legislation that denies the consumer ac-
cess to information, such as the prohibition on the advertise-
ment of discount prices in Belgium to consumers in Luxem-
bourg, cannot be justified under the Treaty.21 8
The same principle of access to information should apply
equally to consumers of services as to consumers of goods.21 9
If the absence of information regarding goods impedes the
right of the Luxembourg consumer to purchase goods in
Belgium, an absence of information regarding services ob-
structs the right of the Irish consumer to receive services in
England. To prevent such an obstruction, the Court in Grogan
should have recognized that the right to receive information
regarding the availability of services must be corollary to the
right to receive services.
As Advocate General Van Gerven noted in Grogan, this
analysis remains valid where the information comes from a
person other than the provider who does not act on the pro-
vider's behalf.220 In GB-INNO, the Court concluded that ac-
214. Luisi and Carbone, [1984] E.C.R. at 406, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. at 81.
215. See id.; see also Cowan v. Le Tr~sor Public, Case 186/87, [1989] E.C.R. 195,
[1990] 2 C.M.L.R. 613 (finding that protection from harm in Member State to which
recipient travels for services is corollary right).
216. See supra notes 39-47 (discussing GB-INNO, Case C-362/88, [19901 E.C.R.
667, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 801).
217. GB-INNO, [1990] E.C.R. at 689, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. at 816.
218. Id. at 690, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. at 817.
219. Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven, Society for the Protection of
Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan, Case C-159/90, [1991] E.C.R. -, -,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 539, 561; see Comm'n White Paper, supra
note 1, at 18 (stating that "distinction between goods and sei-vices has never been a
valid one, and the Community has weakened its own economic potential by maintain-
ing it.").
220. Grogan, [1991] E.C.R. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC at
560.
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cess to information was essential to the free movement of
goods based not on the rights of the provider or advertiser,
but on the right of the consumer to receive information.2 2'
The right to impart information must be inherent in the pri-
mary right to receive it. To be effective, the right to receive
services must be supported by the freedom to receive informa-
tion. This right exists regardless of consideration paid by the
clinics to the students.2 2
Although the Irish Supreme Court asserted that the same
information entered Ireland through other sources, the ab-
sence of the information distributed by the students may im-
pede some women from availing themselves of the service.223
Already, the dearth of information caused by the injunction
has forced women who want abortion services to go to Eng-
land at a later stage of pregnancy.22 4 Although abortion at an
early stage of pregnancy is a safe procedure, abortion at later
stages threatens the woman's life and future ability to bear
children.225 Certainly, the ban hinders the ability of women to
choose a reputable clinic, and to compare cost and conven-
ience. The ban on information which obstructs access to safe,
legal abortion not only hinders the development of service law,
but also may have grave effects on the health of Irish wo-
men. 226 Moreover, even if it is true that some Irish women
have access to this information through newspapers and
magazines, the same argument used against the students in
Grogan can now be extended to others to prevent any informa-
tion about abortion from reaching the Irish public.227 Already,
221. GB-INNO, Case C-362/88, [1990] E.C.R. 667, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 801.
222. See Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven, Grogan, [1991] E.C.R. at ,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC at 560 (stating right to receive services
includes right to receive information even where information comes from one who is
not acting on behalf of provider of services).
223. But see WORLD PRESS REVIEW, Dec. 1990, at 46 (noting that number of Irish
women traveling to England and Wales continues to rise despite restriction); Open
Door Counselling Ltd. and Dublin Well Woman Centre, Ltd. v. Ireland, Joined Cases
14234-35/88, slip op. at 9 (Eur. Comm'n H.R. Mar. 7, 1991). This may be explained,
however, by the possibility that information distributed before the ban may still be
available.
224. Open Door Counselling, slip op. at 9.
225. Ashton, supra note 118, at 10.
226. Id.; see Open Door Counselling, slip op. at 9.
227. See Frankel, supra note 104, at A18 (citing noted author Conor Cruise
O'Brien: "[I]f you follow [SPUC's] logic, you'll have to ban the London telephone
book because it gives you the phone numbers of the abortion clinics."); see also CON-
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Irish editions of Cosmopolitan Magazine have stopped carry-
ing information on abortion based on the decisions by Irish
courts 228
Pregnant women residing in Ireland should have the right,
under Article 59, to travel to England to receive abortion serv-
ices.2 29 As a corollary to that right, women in Ireland should
have the right to receive information regarding clinics in other
Member States. This right to receive information must give
rise to rights under Community law to distribute information.
B. Derogation from the Treaty
Even if the students' activities were protected by Commu-
nity law as a corollary to the right to receive abortion services,
Ireland could derogate from Articles 59 and 60 to protect an
objectively justified public policy imperative. 230 The Court of
Justice emphasizes the need for the Member States to pursue
aims which are justified under the Treaty. 23 ' If a national ob-
jective deliberately or inadvertently conflicts with the Treaty,
especially regarding the establishment of the internal market,
the national objective must give way.232 Therefore, the Court
of Justice requires that the national rule not conflict with free
trade any more than is necessary for the achievement of the
national objective.2 3
The Court of Justice interprets strictly the scope of the
NEXIONS, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS: THE GLOBAL FIGHT 31 (1989) (suggesting Irish
courts' interpretation of eighth amendment would preclude women from giving
abortion information to closest friend without risk of prosecution); Friedman, supra
note 136, at 77 (proposing that Irish courts' interpretation of eighth amendment
would preclude political action to repeal amendment in future). Moreover, several
Member States have begun to censor material destined for Ireland.
228. See Parliamentary Resolution on Abortion, O.J. C 96/19 (1990)
229. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan,
Case C-159/90, [1991] E.C.R. -, -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 539,
579. It is not a criminal offence to obtain an abortion abroad or to travel abroad for
that purpose. Id.; see Open Door Counselling, slip op. at 12.
230. See supra notes 48-83 and accompanying text (discussing derogation from
the Treaty); see also Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven, Grogan, [1991] E.C.R.
at , Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC at 576 (recommending that Court of
Justice conclude that Ireland's ban on information does not violate Treaty based on
public policy derogation).
231. Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven, Grogan, [1991] E.C.R. at -,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC at 565.
232. Id.
233. German Insurance, Case 205/84, [1986] E.C.R. 3755, 3803, [1987] 2
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public policy derogation.2 34 A Member State cannot deter-
mine the scope of the policy derogation unilaterally, although
policies may vary among Member States.235 First, the restric-
tion must be objectively justified to protect an imperative pol-
icy interest. Second, Ireland's action must be "proportional"
or narrowly tailored to its policy goal. Finally, the restriction
must not unjustifiably discriminate, either overtly or covertly,
on the basis of nationality. 23 6
1. Validity of Ireland's Public Policy Objective
Although Ireland's policy objective may be motivated by a
moral conviction against abortion, it cannot be deemed valid
to the extent that it aims to impose its own moral convictions
on another Member State, any more than another Member
State could impose its moral standards on Ireland.237 This
policy interest limits, to some extent, the rights granted by Ar-
ticles 59 and 60.238 For example, Ireland's public policy argu-
ment would undoubtedly justify excluding a doctor who in-
tended to offer abortion services in Ireland, or prohibiting in-
formation regarding the availability of illegal abortions within
Ireland. These situations are closely analogous to Torfaen Bor-
ough Council v. B & Q plc,239 in which the Court of Justice held
that the United Kingdom could derogate from Article 30 to
prohibit shops from opening on Sundays for "socio-cultural"
reasons. 240
A state's public policy concerns do not extend beyond its
own boundaries. For example, no principle in Community law
C.M.L.R. 69, 102 (noting that derogation is only valid where same results cannot be
achieved by less restrictive means).
234. See supra notes 50-71 and accompanying text (discussing public policy dero-
gation).
235. Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven, Society for the Protection of
Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan, Case C-159/90, [1991] E.C.R. -, -,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 539, 566; see supra notes 50-71 and accom-
panying text (discussing public policy derogation).
236. See supra notes 68-83 and accompanying text (discussing discrimination).
237. IR. CONST. art. 40.3.3; see supra notes 93-103 (discussing historical back-
ground of Irish abortion law).
238. See supra notes 48-83 and accompanying text (discussing public policy dero-
gation).
239. Case C-145/88, [1989] E.C.R. 3851, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 337.
240. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (discussing Torfaen Borough
Council v. B & Qplc, Case C-145/88, [1989] E.C.R. 3851, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 337).
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would allow Ireland to prevent a doctor from performing an
abortion procedure in another Member State, regardless of
Ireland's strong public policy. Similarly, SPUC and the Irish
government admitted in the Grogan proceedings that they
would not be able to prevent women from traveling to another
Member State to obtain an abortion.24' The injunction, how-
ever, seeks to impede access to abortions taking place in Eng-
land by denying information which is essential for some wo-
men to take advantage of services available in England. Inso-
far as it obstructs access to a legal service offered in another
Member State, the policy objective should not be considered
valid.
In addition, the free circulation of newspapers and
magazines that contain the same information as that published
by the students24 2 undermines Ireland's argument that Ireland
has a strong public policy against the publication of such infor-
mation.243 In Conegate, Ltd. v. H.M. Customs & Excise,24 4 the
Court of Justice held that the ban on the import of porno-
graphic material was contrary to Community law because the
material was permitted in certain regions of the country.2 4 5 To
support an argument for derogation from the Treaty based on
the need to protect an imperative policy interest, the Court
stated, the United Kingdom would have to show a consistent
policy against the material. Ireland's injunction against the
students in Grogan is similarly untenable. Ireland asserted that
the information published by the students violated the Eighth
241. See Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven, Society for the Protection of
Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan, Case C-159/90, [1991] E.C.R. -, -,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 539, 558; see also Parliamentary Resolution,
supra note 211, O.J. C 106/113 (1991). The European Parliament's resolution con-
cerned the actions of the German border police who forced women suspected of
having had abortions in the Netherlands to undergo gynecological exams. Id.; see
Friedman, supra note 136, at 72. Mr. Friedman notes that since the Irish prohibition
on abortion does not appear to have extraterritorial effect, it is not unlawful to have
an abortion abroad. Id. Therefore, Mr. Friedman continues, "it strains logic, as well
as any minimal conception of free expression, to prohibit persons from speaking of
such activities." Id.
242. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan,
1989 I.R. 760, 771 (Ir. S.C.). But see supra note 228 and accompanying text (noting
Cosmopolitan Magazine's self-censorship as possible trend).
243. See Conegate, Ltd. v. H.M. Customs & Excise, Case 121/85, [1986] E.C.R.
1007, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 739.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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Amendment because it mentioned the availability of legal
abortion services in England.246 Nevertheless, Ireland permits
the same information, contained in other sources, to circulate
freely. Such an inconsistent policy does not support Ireland's
derogation argument.
2. Proportionality of the Means Used to Protect Ireland's
Policy
Even assuming the validity of Ireland's policy objective,
however, any restriction on the free exchange of services must
not have effects beyond what is necessary to protect the objec-
tive. Under Community law, the means used to achieve a pub-
lic policy objective must be proportional to the goal sought.
The proportionality principle has two aspects. First, the re-
striction must be necessary to achieve the valid policy objec-
tive, and must not be capable of fulfillment by less restrictive
means. Second, the restriction cannot be disproportionate to
the aim sought. 4 7
In Grogan, the valid policy objective should be defined as
protecting the right to life of the fetus in Ireland, with due re-
gard for the life of the mother, as mandated by the Constitu-
tion.24  A total ban on the publication or distribution of infor-
mation is not the least restrictive means to achieve this objec-
tive. For example, in certain circumstances, perhaps where a
woman's life is threatened by pregnancy, women may be able
to receive an abortion in Ireland even under Irish law.2 49
These women should have access to information regarding
abortion services offered not only in Ireland, but in other
Member States. By restricting distribution of the student
handbooks to doctors, Ireland could have ensured that the
handbooks were limited to these women. 250 The injunction is-
246. Grogan, 1989 I.R. at 764.
247. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text (discussing proportionality).
248. IR. CONST. art. 40.3.3.
249. See Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan,
1989 I.R. 760, 770 (Ir. S.C.) (noting submission by counsel for defendants); see
CASEY, supra note 88, at 314. In addition, those women whose lives are not endan-
gered have the right to travel to England for abortion services. Opinion of Advocate
General Van Gerven, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v.
Grogan, Case C-159/90, [1991] E.C.R .... Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2
CEC 539, 558.
250. See, e.g., Quietlynn Ltd. v. Southend Borough Council, Case 23/89, [19901
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sued, however, prohibited the very publication of the informa-
tion, 25' despite the fact that dissemination could have been re-
stricted to medical personnel. To draw an analogy to
Torfaen,252 it would be as if the Court of Justice permitted the
United Kingdom to ban all information regarding the possibil-
ity of Sunday shopping in France in order to prevent its nation-
als from circumventing the United Kingdom's public policy. 253
In view of the Court ofJustice's holding in GB-INNO, 54 such a
restriction on information would probably conflict with the
Treaty. Despite close analogy to the cases regarding goods,
and the overbroad effect of Ireland's ban on information, how-
ever, the Court of Justice allowed the ban to remain in effect,
ostensibly based on the students' lack of standing, not on pub-
lic policy concerns. 255
A more appropriate method of protecting Ireland's policy
would be to control the quality or content of information re-
garding abortion to ensure that those women who choose to
have an abortion in England do so with full knowledge of other
possibilities.2 56 The handbooks distributed by the students in
Grogan did not encourage abortion, but only presented abor-
tion as one option available, with no mention of illegal op-
tions.257 In fact, the Irish Supreme Court in Grogan not only
agreed that the students' handbook was non-directive, but also
commended the students for explaining the options for wo-
men who wish to carry the child to term.258
It is unfortunate that the Court of Justice's failure to ad-
E.C.R. -, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 55 (holding that Member State could limit sale of por-
nographic material to licensed shops).
251. Grogan, [1991] E.C.R. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC at
579.
252. Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q'plc, Case 145/88, [1989] E.C.R. 3851,
[1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 337.
253. See supra notes 56-58 (discussing Torfaen).
254. GB-INNO-BM, Case C-362/88, [1990] E.C.R. 667, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 801.
255. Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven, Society for the Protection of
Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan, Case C-159/90, [1991] E.C.R.....
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 539, 579.
256. See supra note 112 (noting that many Member States require counselling
regarding alternatives to abortion).
257. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan,
1989 I.R. 760, 766-67 (Ir. S.C.); see Friedman, supra note 136, at 72 (noting it is not
illegal for Irish women to go abroad for abortion).
258. Id.
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dress the issue allows Ireland to continue to obstruct women
from traveling to England for abortions, by banning all infor-
mation, despite the government's admission that it could not
directly block women.259 Prohibiting the publication of objec-
tive material which is vital to the health of Irish women who are
considering abortion is clearly not the least restrictive means
to guard Ireland's domestic policy. This total ban, therefore, is
disproportionate to Ireland's objective. Ireland should not be
allowed to keep its citizens ignorant in order to prevent them
from exercising fundamental rights guaranteed by the Treaty.
3. Discrimination
Although the ban on information applies equally through-
out Ireland and does not appear to discriminate against the
nationals of other Member States, the effect of the ban is po-
tentially discriminatory in limited circumstances. Arguably,
unlike the restrictions in Luisi and Carbone,260 no service offered
in Ireland benefits from the ban on information about abortion
services in England. The Irish Supreme Court recognized,
however, that in some cases, the Irish Constitution may permit
abortion,26" ' perhaps in order to save the life of the pregnant
woman. In that situation, the ban on information might limit
pregnant women to consideration of doctors in Ireland, to the
exclusion of doctors outside of Ireland who are likely to be
more experienced in the procedure. In those limited circum-
stances, therefore, the ban on information has a discriminatory
effect analogous to that condemned by the Court of Justice in
Luisi and Carbone where the Court found that Italy's limits on
capital export benefitted Italian services to the detriment of
services offered in other Member States.262 The existence of
259. See Grogan, 1989 I.R. at 771; see also Parliamentary Resolution, supra note
211, O.J. C 106/113 (1991) (noting internal borders should not be used to threaten
women for exercising legal right to get abortion in Netherlands). If it is not illegal to
go to England for an abortion, merely speaking of such action cannot justifiably con-
stitute an offence. See, Friedman, supra note 136, at 79-80. The result of the decision
in Grogan, therefore, will not be that women will stop going to England for abortion,
but that they will go in ignorance. See id. at 83.
260. Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro, Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83,
[1984] E.C.R. 377, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 52.
261. See CASEY, supra note 88, at 314.
262. See supra notes 68-71 (discussing Luisi and Carbone).
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discrimination is not determinative;2 6 3 however, when it is cou-
pled with the disproportionality of the policy, a strong argu-
ment can be advanced that Ireland's national policy banning
information on abortion is beyond the scope of a justifiable
public policy derogation, notwithstanding the State's strong
public policy against abortion.
In addition to suggesting a procedure contrary to the prin-
ciple of the supremacy of Community law,2 4 the Irish injunc-
tion directly violates Article 59 of the Treaty by imposing a
new restriction on the flow of services.265 Both the students in
Grogan and the clinics in Open Door Counselling undertook the
activities in question unimpeded until the Eighth Amendment
was enacted. 66 Based on that new amendment, enacted after
the Treaty, SPUC was able to win judgments suspending the
activities of the students and the clinics. Such unilateral action
by a Member State passing new restrictions on the free flow of
services is prohibited by Article 59267 as well as by the Court of
263. See supra notes 68-83 (discussing discrimination).
264. It is well established that Community law takes precedence over contrary
national law, including "fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution of that
state." IHG, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, 1134, [1972] C.M.L.R. 255, 283; see
Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd., Case C-213/89,
[ 1990] E.C.R. 2433, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1; see also Jay J. Aragon~s, Comment, Regina
v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd.: The Limits of Parliamentary
Sovereignty and the Rule of Community Law, 14 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 778, 781-87 (1990-
1991) (discussing Court of Justice's view of supremacy of Community law). In Costa
v. ENEL, the Court of Justice clearly stated that the Treaty created a new legal order
whose norms cannot be overridden by subsequent national law. Costa v. ENEL, Case
6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585, 593-594, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425, 456. Nevertheless, the
Court ofJustice in Grogan did not challenge the Irish Supreme Court's assertion that
the Eighth Amendment, because it was later in time, might modify the Treaty. Soci-
ety for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan, 1989 I.R. 760,
768 (Ir. S.C.). The Irish Supreme Court also stated that determination of that ques-
tion could only be decided by the national court. Id.; see Walsh, supra note 85, at 817
(stating integration of Community law on fundamental rights into Irish law might
compel Ireland to leave Community). These assertions by the Supreme Court are
clearly contrary to the principles of Community law. Moreover, allowing a Member
State to amend Treaty provisions unilaterally threatens the integration of the Com-
munity. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing danger of unilateral
action by Member State).
265. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 59. The Irish Supreme Court based its find-
ing that the status quo ante was the illegality of the publication of information re-
garding information on the availability of abortion services in England on Open Door
Counselling and the Eighth Amendment. Grogan, 1989 I.R. at 764.
266. Open Door Counselling Ltd. and Dublin Well Woman Centre v. Ireland,
Joined Cases 14234 & 14235/88, slip op. at 11 (Eur. Comm'n H.R. Mar. 7, 1991).
267. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 59.
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Justice's jurisprudence.2 68
C. The Court of Justice Avoided Resolving a Clear Conflict
of Rights
The Court of Justice's main justification for upholding the
validity of Ireland's ban on information was the absence of a
link between the students distributing the literature and the
clinics providing the services. The Court, however, has never
previously discussed the necessity of this link. Prior to Grogan,
the Court of Justice focused on the rights of the recipient of
services and the purchaser of goods. The Court generally had
sought to remove any obstruction, direct or indirect, actual or
potential, 69 which hindered access to goods and services.
By creating the link theory, the Court of Justice removed
Grogan from the scope of the Treaty.2 70 The Court reasoned
that without a link to the economic operator, and without re-
ceiving consideration for their activities, the students were
neither the providers nor the recipients of services, and there-
fore not entitled to Treaty protection.2 7 ' The Court shifted
the focus away from the Irish women, who, as recipients of
services, are hindered by the ban on information. Because of
this reformulation of the issue, the Court was able to avoid the
question of fundamental rights which it otherwise would have
been obliged to address.272
The Court of Justice has consistently held that fundamen-
268. See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text (discussing Court ofJustice's
interpretation of Articles 59-60); see also supra note 85 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing danger of unilateral action by Member State).
269. Procureur de Roi v. Dassonville, Case 8/74, [1974] E.C.R. 837, 852, [1974]
2 C.M.L.R. 436, 453-54. The Dassonville Court stated that "[a]ll trading rules ...
which are capable of hindering directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-
Community trade are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to
quantitative restrictions." Id. Although the test set forth in Dassonville was modified
by Cassis de Dijon, Case 120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649, [1979] C.M.L.R. 494, the defini-
tion of an obstruction which contravenes the Treaty as "indirect" or "potential" re-
mains valid. See, e.g., GB-INNO-BM, Case C-362/88, [1990] E.C.R. 667, [1991]
2 C.M.L.R. 801.
270. See supra notes 84-91 (discussing Court of Justice's jurisdiction in area of
fundamental rights).
271. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Irelaind Ltd. v. Grogan, Case
C-159-90, [1991] E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC 539, 579.
272. See supra notes 84-91 (discussing Court of Justice's jurisdiction in area of
fundamental rights).
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tal rights form an integral part of Community law.273 Member
States must ensure that the Community laws they implement
are compatible with fundamental rights, as determined by the
Court of Justice by examining the Human Rights Convention
and the constitutional traditions of the Member States. 274
Once a case falls within the scope of the Treaty, the Court
must address the fundamental rights conflict. 5 The Court,
however, has no power to examine the compatibility of na-
tional legislation which falls outside the scope of Community
law with the Human Rights Convention. 76 The link theory
thus placed the issue outside the scope of the Treaty and per-
mitted the Court ofJustice to decline to resolve the fundamen-
tal rights conflict.
1. Compatibility of the Ban on Abortion Information and
the Right to Freedom of Expression
In Grogan, two rules deriving from fundamental rights
came into conflict. First, Article 10 of the Human Rights Con-
vention guarantees every Member State national "the right to
hold opinions and receive and impart information and ideas"
without state interference.27 7 The right may be restricted as
"prescribed by law," however, provided the restrictions are
"necessary in a 'democratic society' " to protect the public.278
Second, the Eighth Amendment to the Irish Constitution pro-
vides that Ireland must acknowledge the right to life of the fe-
273. See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven, Grogan, [1991] E.C.R. at
-, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC at 568; Nold v. Commission, Case 4/73,
[1974] E.C.R. 491, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 338.
274. Wachauf v. Germany, Case 5/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2609, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R.
328; see supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (discussing that Court determines
fundamental rights by considering those rights enunciated in European Convention
on Human Rights and constitutions of Member States).
275. Nold, [1974] E.C.R. at 507, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 354.
276. Demirel v. Stadt Schwabisch Gmiund, Case 12/86, [1987] E.C.R. 3719,
[1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 421. A public policy based decision, recognizing the students'
activities as constituting a necessary corollary to the free exchange of services, but
allowing a derogation based on public policy, seems more consistent with the Court's
precedents. However, such a decision would have eased the strict definition of public
policy concerns which the court has developed. A broad public policy definition
would allow a larger number of derogations by the Member States, slowing the for-
mation of the internal market.
277. Human Rights Convention, supra note 6, art. 10.
278. Id. A similar provision was established in article 5 of the joint declaration
of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, O.J. C 103/1 (1977).
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tus "with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother"
only "insofar as is practicable. '2 79 Neither the right to life of
the fetus under Irish law nor the right to freedom of expres-
sion under the Convention on Human Rights, of course, is ab-
solute. An analysis of the conflict would compel the Court to
balance the importance of these rights to determine how much
of one right can be sacrificed to protect the other right. 80
The Irish law, giving equal regard to the right to life of the
woman, may in certain cases allow a woman to abort the fetus
for her own safety. In this situation, a woman would be enti-
tled to choose the most appropriate clinic for her needs. To
do so, the woman would need information such as that distrib-
uted by the students, particularly because the doctors in other
Member States, where abortion is legal, are likely to be more
experienced in the procedure. Moreover, the amendment
specifies protection only insofar as is practicable. 28 ' Arguably,
ordering an injunction which violates the existing right to re-
ceive the information granted by the Human Rights Conven-
tion is not "practicable.12 8 2 This is more apparent when one
considers that the right to life of the fetus can be protected in
Ireland by means which would not violate the right to freedom
of expression, or at least would restrict it to a lesser degree.28 3
The right to receive and impart information, guaranteed
by the Human Rights Convention, is similarly qualified.28 4
The right to receive and impart information is subject to re-
strictions that are prescribed by law.28 5 The Commission of
279. IR. CONST. art. 40.3.3. But see Friedman, supra note 136, at 76 (suggesting
that amendment is worded to guarantee confusion and paradox).
280. The Court of Justice is not unfamiliar with this balancing procedure. As
the Advocate General in Grogan noted, the analysis is similar to that engaged in to
determine the proportionality of a Member State's restriction with the public policy
objective sought. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v.
Grogan, Case C-159/90, [1991] E.C.R. -, -, [1991] 2 CEC 539, 563. Moreover, the
Court has previously been called on to balance the fundamental right to property
against Community interest in economic stability. See, e.g., Hauer v. Land Rheinland-
Pfalz, Case 44/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3727, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 42.
281. IR. CONST. art. 40.3.3.
282. See Human Rights Convention, supra note 6, art. 10; see also IR. CONST. art.
40.3.3.
283. See supra note 250 and accompanying text (discussing less restrictive meas-
ures).
284. Human Rights Convention, supra note 6, art. 10.
285. Id.
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Human Rights noted, however, that two requirements derive
from the phrase "prescribed by law."' 28 6 First, the restriction
must exist in a form that is adequately accessible. 87 Second,
the legal consequences of an action must be foreseeable in or-
der to allow the individual to act accordingly.288
The European Commission on Human Rights, addressing
the conflict between the right to life of the fetus and the right
to free expression raised in Open Door Counselling, found that
the Irish information ban was not permissible under Article 10
because at the time the clinics were advising clients of abortion
services available in England, the restriction of their activity
was not "accessible" in any precise form, nor were the conse-
quences of the clinics' actions foreseeable. 28 9 Because Open
Door Counselling was still on appeal at the time the students in
Grogan distributed the handbooks, the validity of the ban on
information arguably had not yet been determined. There-
fore, the government's action banning the information pub-
lished by the students, insofar as the publication was not yet
prohibited by law, was invalid under Community law as it is
well established that a national provision which is not compati-
ble with Community law is invalid. 290 At a minimum, the
Court of Justice should have held that the students could not
have violated a ban on information which did not yet exist at
the time of their activities.
Moreover, even if the ban could be seen as accessible fol-
lowing the Supreme Court's decision in Open Door Counsel-
ling,29 ' the consequences with regard to the students were
hardly foreseeable. As the Supreme Court noted in Grogan, the
same information published by the students was available in
newspapers and magazines that circulated freely in Ireland.
The law as articulated by the Supreme Court was aimed at
counsellors and doctors, not publicists. The students' activi-
ties seem more analogous to the activities of a magazine than a
286. Open Door Counselling Ltd. and Dublin Well Woman Centre v. Ireland,
Joined Cases 14234-35/88, slip op. at 11 (Eur. Comm'n H.R. Mar. 7, 1991).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 13.
290. Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585, 456, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425,
593-94.
291. Open Door Counselling Ltd. and Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd. v. Ire-
land, Joined Cases 14234-35/88, slip op. at 12 (Eur. Comm'n H.R. Mar. 7, 1991).
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counsellor. It is not unreasonable to assert that they were una-
ware of the possible consequences of their actions.
Finally, to protect the right to freedom of expression in
the Community in the future, particularly in Ireland, the Court
of Justice should have recognized that even if the right to im-
part information regarding abortion was clearly articulated at
the time of the students' activities, the injunction would be in-
valid under the general principles of Community law. In bal-
ancing the right to life of the fetus against the right to freedom
of expression, the Court should have noted that under the con-
stitutional traditions of every other Member State abortion is
permitted, albeit with varying degrees of legal restriction. 92
Moreover, neither the Commission of Human Rights nor the
Court of Justice recognizes the right to life of the fetus.293
Freedom of expression, in contrast, is protected as vital by
the Human Rights Convention 294 and recognized by all the
Member States, including Ireland.2 95 Interference with free-
dom of expression is only justified when "necessary in a demo-
cratic society. ' 296 Ireland claims the ban on information is
necessary, yet admits that the same information reaches the
public through other sources.297 Either Ireland plans to cen-
sor those other sources, or does not consider the information a
threat to its society. 298 If it directs the ban against. the media,
Ireland will likely cross the line of proportionality established
by the Court of Justice. The importance of objective informa-
292. See supra notes 104-14 and accompanying text (discussing European abor-
tion laws).
293. See, e.g., Open Door Counselling, slip op. at 11; see also European Parliament,
Resolution on Abortion, O.J. C 96/19 (1990) (condemning Ireland's decisions re-
garding abortion and calling for legalization to prevent "abortion tourism" and im-
prove women's health). For a decision regarding abortion in the European Commis-
sion of Human Rights, see Paton v. United Kingdom, Case 8416/78, 3 E.H.R.R. 408
(noting in dictum that fetus does not have absolute right to life).
294. Open Door, slip op. at 13.
295. IR. CONST. art. 40.6.1; see Eamonn Hall & Patrick McGovern, Regulation of
the Media: Irish and European Community Dimensions, 8 DUBLIN U. L.J. 1, 23 (1986) (riot-
ing essential character of impartial dissemination of information in Ireland).
296. Human Rights Convention, supra note 6, art. 10.
297. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan,
1989 I.R. 760, 771 (Ir. S.C.).
298. See Conegate, Ltd. v. H.M. Customs & Excise, Case 121/85, [1986] E.C.R.
1007, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 739 (finding United Kingdom did not prove imperative pol-
icy interest in banning pornographic material because it could circulate in certain
parts of country).
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tion to a woman who plans to get an abortion abroad-as she
is legally entitled to do-outweighs Ireland's weak interest in
preventing the student publication.
2. Socio-Cultural Conformity in the Community
Some commentators believe that decisions forcing social
conformity are unnecessary for economic union.299 The objec-
tive of the Treaty, they argue, is not to homogenize the Com-
munity in every social and political aspect, but to create an eco-
nomic union that will benefit the Member States while allowing
them to preserve their unique cultural attributes. According to
this argument, the Court of Justice should harmonize national
laws only to the extent necessary to ensure economic union.
The Court of Justice, to some extent, seems to support this
view. For example, the Court upheld Ireland's requirement
that its full-time public school teachers speak Gaelic, despite
the discriminatory effect the requirement had on teachers from
other Member States.30
The Court has not hesitated, however, to deny the "socio-
cultural" justifications for derogation from the Treaty where
the restrictions imposed by a Member State threatened the vi-
tality of intra-Community trade. For example, in Bond Van Ad-
verteers v. Netherlands, the Court recognized the Netherlands' in-
terest in maintaining the "non-commercial, pluralistic" nature
of its broadcasting system .30  The Court noted, however, that
the prohibitions of advertising and broadcasting placed on
cable operators receiving transmissions from outside the
Netherlands hindered the free flow of services and discrimi-
nated against the providers of services established in other
Member States.30 2  Despite the Netherlands' public policy
goal, the Court thus concluded that the restrictions could not
be justified on the grounds of a public policy derogation.0 3
In a more controversial decision, the Court of Justice re-
fused to allow the United Kingdom to bar the importation of
299. Anthony Blinken, Womb for Debate, NEw REPUBLIC, July 8, 1991, at 12.
300. Groener v. Minister of Education and City of Dublin Vocational Education
Committee, Case 379/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3967, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 401.
301. Bond Van Adverteerders v. Netherlands, Case 352/85, [1988] E.C.R. 2085,
2135, [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. 113, 151.
302. Id. at 2136, [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. at 152.
303. Id.
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pornographic items, despite the United Kingdom's public pol-
icy objection, where a lawful trade in the same goods existed
within the United Kingdom. 04 The Court has refused to rec-
ognize strong public policy justifications for derogation from
the Treaty in the past, where the imposed restriction hindered
intra-Community trade. It should not have hesitated to find
that Ireland's ban on abortion information violated the Treaty,
insofar as it impacted negatively on services offered by other
Member States.
CONCLUSION
The prohibition of abortion within Ireland is a matter for
national determination. The Community should not interfere
in Ireland's laws protecting the right to life of the fetus. Never-
theless, when national rules unnecessarily hinder intra-Com-
munity trade, as does the ban on information regarding the
availability of abortion services in another Member State, the
matter concerns the entire Community.
The Court of Justice determined that abortion is a service
within the meaning of the Treaty and has previously recog-
nized that corollary rights are necessary to insure the free
movement of services.30 5 In the area of goods, which is analo-
gous to services, the Court recognizes that the consumer's ac-
cess to information is essential to free movement.30 6 It is un-
fortunate that the Court in Grogan did not clearly recognize
that Irish consumers have a right to receive information re-
garding services available in England. Such a decision would
not contradict Ireland's right to regulate abortion within its
borders, and would be consistent with Community law as well
as with the general principles established in the Human Rights
Convention.
304. Conegate, Ltd. v. H.M. Customs & Excise, Case 121/85, [1986] E.C.R.
1007, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 739.
305. Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro, Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83,
[1984] E.C.R. 377, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 52.
306. See GB-INNO, Case C-362/88, [1990] E.C.R. 667, 689, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R.
801,816.
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POST SCRIPTUM
As this Comment went to print, the controversy surround-
ing the Eighth Amendment re-emerged in reaction to the
plight of a fourteen-year-old victim of an alleged rape' who
was restrained by the High Court from leaving Ireland for nine
months. 2 The decision sparked protests throughout Ireland,
and led to demands for revision of the Eighth Amendment to
allow for a limited right to abortion.3 In a one-line decision,
the Supreme Court lifted the injunction, allowing the girl to
leave Ireland.4 Although the Supreme Court's decision solved
the immediate crisis, demands for a new referendum to revise
the Eighth Amendment are likely to continue.
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